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A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL
CHOICE: CAN THE POLEMIC OF LEGAL PROBLEMS BE
OVERCOME?
Philip T.K. Daniel*
INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the Ohio legislature passed the "Omnibus Education Re-
form Act," which called for local school districts to adopt a policy of
educating the state's kindergarten through twelfth-grade students in
accordance with the concept of parental choice.1 The original legis-
lation, implemented in July of 1993, entailed two corresponding
plans. First, an "intradistrict choice" plan allows children to apply
for acceptance at any public school located within the school district
of their residence.2 Second, all school boards are required to adopt a
policy of acceptance or rejection of an "interdistrict choice" plan
allowing students to attend a public school in the district from an
adjacent district without paying tuition.' A third plan, introduced in
three 1992 legislative bills, suggests a program whereby certain stu-
dents may seek admission to a public or private school in the state
with support from state "vouchers" in the amount of the per-pupil
cost of that school. 4
* Associate Professor, The Ohio State University. B.S., 1969, Cheyney University of Pennsyl-
vania; M.S., 1970, University of Illinois, Urbana; Ed.D., 1973, University of Illinois, Urbana;
'A.C.E. Fellow, 1981-82, Washington University, St. Louis; J.D., 1990, Northern Illinois Univer-
sity. Funding for this research was provided in part by the Office of Policy Research for Ohio
Based Education (PROBE) of the Ohio State University, Dr. Brad Mitchell, Director.
1. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.97, 3313.98, 3313.981, 3317.022, 3327.05 (Anderson
1990). Please note that the "choice" concept is variously labeled as "choice," "parental choice,"
"school choice," and "educational choice." All of these terms are used interchangeably throughout
this article.
2. Id. § 3313.97.
3. Id. § 3313.98.
4. See 1992 Ohio H.B. 635, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1992); 1992 Ohio
H.B. 825, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (July 15, 1992); 1992 Ohio H.B. 851, 119th
Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Aug. 28, 1992). These bills, which have not yet been voted on,
are intended to create a five-year pilot voucher program. The bills would permit schoolchildren to
attend private and sectarian schools, supported by state funds, as long as the institution does not
require students to participate in any religious activity. One of the bills states: "The Department
shall distribute . . . a voucher in the amount of the per pupil cost to educate a child in the district
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School choice has emerged as one of the major reform movements
in education in the past five years, and Ohio has joined several
states and many individual school districts that have created or are
considering programs in this area.5 Some reformers view school
choice as the vehicle for restructuring and improving the nation's
schools.6 Even though these reformers have referred to it as the
"panacea" for educational reform,7 educational choice can have sev-
eral definitions, as seen by the descriptions listed above. 8 An exami-
nation of the states' individual choice plans indicates there is little
uniformity and some confusion. State legislation has taken many
different forms and has resulted in unanticipated problems and
other less-than-positive effects on program participants. Quickly en-
acted legislation resulting from public pressure to "cure" the na-
tion's education woes has not proven to be effective. This article will
give a short history of school choice, present an overview of school
choice options, and examine the various positions of supporters and
detractors of this reform movement. The article will also outline the
legal issues created by choice legislation and discuss the implications
of the analysis for policy makers. To give a more concrete picture of
how choice is to be implemented, this article will refer to the pro-
posed Ohio plan as well as other private and government-sponsored
reports.
where the student is entitled to attend school. .... The voucher may be presented to any chartered
public or nonpublic school in this state that admits the student." 1992 Ohio H.B. 635, at 5. The
Ohio Scholarship Plan encourages students to "choose freely among public and non-public
schools" and suggests a modification of the original bill's language so that private sectarian
schools can require attendance at, but not require participation in, religious activities of the
school." GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON EDUC. CHOICE, THE OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN 2, 7 (1992)
[hereinafter OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN] (copy on file with the author).
5. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERAGENCY AF-
FAIRS, CTR. FOR CHOICE IN EDUC., REVIEW OF STATE CHOICE LEGISLATION (September 1992)
[hereinafter LEGISLATION REVIEW].
This is the latest government report, and its data show that: in 1989, four states - Arkansas,
Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio - adopted parental choice in some form; in 1990, seven states -
Wisconsin, Colorado, Washington, Vermont, Utah, Idaho, and Kentucky - enacted choice plans;
and in 1990, ten states approved some form of new choice legislation, 37 states had choice legisla-
tion pending in one form or another, and at least 12 states had citizen coalitions working on choice
initiatives or proposals. Id. See infra Appendix A (delineating some of the changes in the govern-
ment's data and synopsizing the choice movement in every state at the time of this report).
6. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 215-26
(1990).
7. Id. at 217.
8. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix A (explaining the
choice options available in each state).
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I. HISTORY OF PARENTAL CHOICE
Parents choosing an education for their children is hardly a novel
idea, having been a goal of reformers since at least the eighteenth
century. 9 How choice evolved - if at all - from these ideas, how-
ever, is not a matter of early historical record. What we do know is
that choice has not always involved the public schools.
The concept of an overall educational system featuring parental
choice actually arose as early as 1776 in Adam Smith's book, An
Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.'
Applying his capitalist philosophy to an educational sphere, he rea-
soned that if the state paid all of the costs of a child's education, the
teacher "would soon learn to neglect his business."'" Also in the
eighteenth century, Thomas Paine proposed a deregulated educa-
tional plan where education would be compulsory and in which
every family would receive a specified amount of money for each of
their children to attend school up to the age of fourteen.' 2 In the
nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill advocated the use of tuition
vouchers, indicating that choices in education must apply to both
public and private institutions.'3
The modern scheme for parental choice in education itself is al-
most forty years old. In 1955, Milton Friedman argued from an eco-
nomic perspective that such plans were feasible if market forces
were permitted to reign. 4 Specifically, Friedman theorized that if
parents could choose any school, public or private, with state sup-
port through vouchers, this would break the monopoly of the public
schools and increase educational competition. 5 In other words, if
free market forces were let loose, the American education system
would be more effective and efficient.'" Friedman coined the term
9. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing the early evolution of the theory
of educational choice).
10. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
716-740 (Edwin Cannan ed., First Modern Library ed. 1937) (5th ed. 1741).
11. Id. at 737.
12. E.G. West, Tom Paine's Voucher Scheme for Public Education, 33 S. ECON. J. 378, 381
(1967) (citing THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF-MAN 248 (Everyman's ed. 1961) (London 1791)).
13. Id. at 379 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ashley ed.,
1915) (London n.d.)).
14. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-108 (1962) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM]; Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECO-
NOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123-144 (Robert A. Solo ed. 1955) [hereinafter Friedman,
Role of Government].
15. FRIEDMAN. CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 14, at 89, 99.
16. Id. at 91, 99.
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"educational voucher" and determined that vouchers would increase
the access of families, especially poor ones, to quality education.' 7
Resistance to the notion of parental choice began shortly after the
proposal of the Friedman theory. This was due to the fear that such
actions might undermine the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v.
Board of Education,'8 which sought to end state-mandated segrega-
tion. 9 After the unanimous decision in Brown, many southern states
attempted to create state-supported voucher systems for white fami-
lies who sent their children to segregated private schools.20 In addi-
tion, they created parental choice programs for public schools which
technically permitted African-Americans and whites to transfer out
of segregated school systems but which provided neither incentives
nor the legal apparatus to dismantle centuries of state-supported
discrimination. 2' Hostile white administrators, teachers, and stu-
dents who sought to dissuade African-American enrollment at the
all-white public schools confronted those who desired to transfer.22
Parental choice in the 1950s and 1960s, therefore, came to be linked
to the perpetuation of segregation.
The symbiosis of parental choice and unconstitutional school seg-
regation was demonstrated in a major Supreme Court decision in
1968. The Court struck down a school choice plan in Green v.
County School Board of New Kent County,23 indicating that it was
an insufficient and unacceptable desegregation tool and that school
officials, not black children, have an "affirmative obligation" to dis-
17. Id. at 99.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown ").
19. See id. at 492 (noting that segregation had long been a nationwide problem).
20. Henry M. Levin, Market Approaches to Education: Vouchers and School Choice, II
EcON. EDUC. R. 279, 280 (1992) [hereinafter Levin, Vouchers and School Choice].
21. Amy Stuart Wells, Choice in Education: Examining the Evidence of Equity, 93 TEACHERS
C. REC. 137, 140 (1991).
22. Id. Intolerance for integrated education was by no means limited to the South. White
groups in Chicago, Illinois, for example, monitored the influx of African-Americans into the pub-
lic schools and set up numerous barriers to desegregation that were supported by municipal au-
thorities. Examples of activity designed to prevent integration included residential segregation,
discriminatory employment practices, the creation of vice houses, and the outward hostility of
school officials, teachers, and students. In Chicago, black students found it almost impossible to
transfer to schools with white students, as official school board policy was to divide attendance
along racial lines. When black students did get transfers, officials frequently revoked them after
the students showed up for school. Students who escaped detection from school officials often went
back to the black schools to escape the wrath of white students. See generally Philip T.K. Daniel,
A History of Discrimination Against Black Students in Chicago Secondary Schools, 20 HIST.
EDUC. Q. 147 (1980) (examining the integration/segregation dilemma in Illinois from a historical
perspective).
23. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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mantle racially identifiable schools. 4 In Green, the Court noted that
there were "practical conditions" in the southern states, especially
black economic dependency on whites and threats of white reprisals,
that prevented the exercise of free parental choice.2 5 This had a tre-
mendous negative effect on the choice movement, not only in the
courts, but also in the United States Congress. Between 1967 and
1977, the House of Representatives introduced six bills which em-
phasized some element of parental choice, but none of them
passed.2
Criticism of American public schools ran unabated despite deseg-
regation efforts, with some reformers going so far as to describe the
system as a "wasteland. 2 1 Among other reforms of public school-
ing, some were still proposing a parental choice plan using vouchers
as a solution, particularly for the problems faced by minority chil-
dren in the cities. 8 Many educators promoted a voucher system for
poor and minority students and, in 1969, the United States Office of
Equal Opportunity provided funding for proposals in voucher exper-
iments. 9 What was proposed was a highly regulated voucher plan
designed specifically for poor children of public school age, featuring
both eligibility criteria for the participating schools and particular-
ized admissions standards.30
In the 1970s, authors John Coons and Stephen Sugarman
emerged as the leading proponents of parental choice through the
use of educational vouchers, which they dubbed "scholarship certifi-
cates."131 The thrust of their arguments centered around the need for
family participation in school decision-making. They advocated
24. Id. at 440-41.
25. Id. at 440 n.5.
26. Hearings on S. 550 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of
the Committee on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1981).
27. See Peter W. Cookson, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools: A Review, 93 TEACHERS
C. REC. 156, 156 (1991).
28. In 1966, for example, Christopher Jencks proposed that universities take over some public
schools, that business take over the management of some schools, that teachers have independent
charters to manage schools, and that students receive tuition grants to attend any school, whether
public or private. See Christopher Jencks, Is the Public School Obsolete?, THE PUB. INTEREST,
Winter 1966, at 18, 26-27.
29. Levin, Vouchers and School Choice, supra note 20, at 280 (citing CENTER FOR THE STUDY
OF PUB. POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS, A REPORT ON FINANCING ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BY
GRANTS To PARENTS (1970)).
30. Id.
31. JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAM-
ILY CONTROL 31 (1978).
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soliciting the participation of parochial schools in order to have the
space available exceed the number of students. As the number of
spaces increased, schools would have to improve the quality of edu-
cation in order to attract students.32 This approach illustrates the
departure of the Coons/Sugarman theory from that of Friedman's
strict economic focus with its emphasis on an equilibrium between
supply and demand. The Coons/Sugarman approach concentrates
on the objective of improving education; "[serving] the best interest
of the individual child; [fostering] consensus on the constitutional
order; and [achieving] racial integration. 3
The work of Coons and Sugarman served as the backdrop for a
campaign in the 1970s to place a voucher system before California
voters. 4 The authors themselves were very active in this initiative.
But although the proponents of the legislation created a re-awaken-
ing and awareness of parental choice, they failed to receive enough
signatures to attach the issue to a state ballot. 5
The 1980s began a period of protracted efforts to address per-
ceived shortcomings in American education. Numerous national re-
ports indicated that the American public education system had
fallen into a malaise. For example, a report sponsored by the United
States Department of Education, entitled A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform, issued a scathing indictment of
public education and indicated that if something wasn't immediately
done, the schools faced a "rising tide of mediocrity. 3 6 Paul Copper-
man, an analyst quoted in the report, proclaimed that, "For the first
time in the history of our country, the educational skills of one gen-
eration will not surpass, will not equal, will not even approach, those
of their parents. ' 37 The general report continued by stating that
"[o]ur once unchallenged preeminence in commerce, industry, sci-
ence and technological innovation is being overtaken by competitors
throughout the world."3 This problem confronting American public
schoolchildren has resulted in lower test scores compared with those
32. Id. at 153-54.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Levin, Vouchers and School Choice, supra note 20, at 280.
35. Id.
36. NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., A NA-
TION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATION REFORM, A REPORT TO THE NATION AND THE
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 5 (1983) [hereinafter A NATION AT RISK].
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id. at 5.
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of students from other industrialized countries, with especially weak
performance among children from poor, minority, and single-parent
families. 9
In the years that followed this 1983 study, implementation of pro-
grams aggressively aimed at improving schools answered this call
for reform. Included among these reform activities were: increased
state allocations for local school system budgets; tighter state con-
trols over curriculum, personnel training, textbook selection, instruc-
tional methods, and discipline; the creation of school-based manage-
ment plans; and a greater voice in school decisions for teachers.'
These attempts at providing public education with an elixir, how-
ever, seemed to have little impact on the public's perception of edu-
cation. For example, a Gallup poll conducted in 1988 showed that
64 percent of this country's population would give the public schools
a grade of "C" or below when evaluating the effectiveness of Ameri-
can schools in educating their children."
One of the reforms fostered by national reports such as A Nation
at Risk involved the resurrected plan of school choice. Indeed,
school choice "emerged as the single most rousing idea in the cur-
rent school reform effort."' 2 Numerous states and several individual
school districts adopted choice plans, and for many this was their
only in-place reform strategy.'
The idea of school choice received new impetus as the result of a
symbiosis of traditional conservative support and a new found lib-
eral constituency. In 1990, the Brookings Institute, a liberal think
tank, published a book by John E. Chubb and Terry Moe, entitled
Politics, Markets and America's Schools, supporting school choice
plans." They proposed a radical reform plan on the theory that
39. Id. at 8.
40. See generally JOHN I. GOODLAD, A PLACE CALLED SCHOOL: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
(1984) (analyzing various educational reform activities); CHRISTINE M. SHEA ET AL., THE NEW
SERVANTS OF POWER: A CRITIQUE OF THE 1980's REFORM MOVEMENT (1989) (surveying the
educational reform movement during the 1970s and 1980s and arguing that the reform movement
has not reconciled the inequities suffered by women and minorities); Betty Malen et al., What Do
We Know About School-Based Management: A Case Study of the Literature - A Call for Re-
search, in CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 289-341 (William H. Clune et. al.
eds., 1990) (reviewing and interpreting literature on school-based management).
41. Alec M. Gallup & Stanley M. Elam, 20th Annual Gallup Survey on Public's Attitudes
Toward the Public Schools, 70 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 33, 36 (1988).
42. CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE: A SPECIAL
REPORT 1 (1992) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
43. Id.; see generally LEGISLATION REVIEW, supra note 5.
44. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 1.
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schools should be based on the competitive market model, should be
open equally to public, private, and parochial schools, and should be
financed through tax-subsidized vouchers.45 In their book, the au-
thors demonstrated just how sanguine they were about the postu-
lated ideas, stating, "Without being too literal about it, we think
reformers would do well to entertain the notion that choice is a
'panacea.'"-4 They went on to write:
Choice is a self-contained reform with its own rationale and justification. It
has the capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of transformation that,
for years, reformers have been seeking to engineer in myriad other ways.
Indeed, if choice is to work to greatest advantage, it must be adopted with-
out these other reforms, since the latter are predicated on democratic con-
trol and are implemented by bureaucratic means. 7
Thus, Chubb and Moe stood convinced that a free-market system
was the only way to reform American education. A corollary posi-
tion was that market-driven schools are educationally more effective
than those that are democratically controlled. According to the au-
thors, democracy leads to bureaucracy, thus placing heavy, unwieldy
demands on schools and making them inefficient and unresponsive to
the educational needs of students. They postulated that only by re-
lieving schools of this bureaucracy caused by democracy could stu-
dents ever become competitive again. 8
On the political right, conservative leadership under former Presi-
dent George Bush embraced the ideas of Chubb and Moe in the
education reform package known as America 2000."' In describing
this plan at a campaign fundraiser, President Bush said:
Our future depends on education reform, on our ability to revolutionize, lit-
erally reinvent our schools, to take that revolution beyond the four walls of
the classroom, transform our attitudes and ideas, the way we think about
education.
[W]e must create an incentive to improve education by promoting school
choice. For far too long, we've shielded our schools from competition, al-
lowed the system a damaging monopoly power over students. Well, just as
monopolies are bad for the economy, they're bad for our kids. Every parent
should have the power to choose which school is best for his child, public,
45. Id. at 215-26.
46. Id. at 217 (emphasis in original).
47. Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 216-17.
49. The Bush administration coined the term "America 2000" in April of 1991, when it re-
leased the President's plan for educational reform. The plan is reduced to bill form in H.R. 2460,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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private or religious."
Bush attempted to put teeth into this reform agenda by calling for a
parental choice bill that would have authorized federal scholarships
in amounts up to $1,000 for children of middle and low-income fam-
ilies to attend any school, whether public, private, or religious.51
Following this initiative, Wisconsin became the first state to enact
legislation providing for a limited school choice plan involving pri-
vate schools. The Wisconsin legislature passed the Milwaukee Pa-
rental Choice Program 2 as part of the state's 1990-1991 budget
bill. In March, 1992, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the plan
as valid under the Wisconsin constitution.5" In the three years lead-
ing up to that decision, Ohio and four other states54 passed choice
legislation. The Ohio legislation, implemented in July of 1993, fol-
lowed in the wake of the conflict in Wisconsin. The next section
more fully describes the Ohio legislation.
II. SCHOOL CHOICE OPTIONS
School choice, in general terms, is the privilege of parents to se-
lect schools for their children, either inside or outside their district
of residence, with enabling support provided by their local, state, or
national government.55 The idea of choice rests upon the twin prin-
ciples of increased competition and the alignment of students with
the best possible schools for their needs. The privilege of choice may
extend to a public or private school, with parents being subsidized
by the government in the form of a voucher or income tax credit.56
50. Remarks of President Bush to the Lehigh Valley 2000 Community, PUB. PAPERS 609, 610,
612 (Apr. 16, 1992).
51. Levin, Vouchers and School Choice, supra note 20, at 281.
52. WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1990).
53. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 477 (Wis. 1992).
54. The four states besides Ohio are Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, and Nebraska. See infra Ap-
pendix A (surveying the choice legislation currently available throughout the country).
55. Local school districts such as East Harlem in New York City have established choice pro-
grams. See, e.g., David L. Kirp, What School Choice Really Means, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov.
1992, at 119 (analyzing the reasons behind the achievements of the East Harlem program). Nu-
merous states have passed legislation supporting state-based educational choice. See also infra
Appendix A for a delineation of the choice programs available in each state. The former Bush
administration not only expressed support for these programs, but attempted to allocate federal
tax dollars for their promotion. Augustus F. Hawkins, Becoming Preeminent in Education:
America's Greatest Challenge, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 381 (1991).
56. Vouchers refer to government tax dollars given to parents to fully fund or supplement a
student's attendance at a public or private school. Tuition tax credits refer to a kind of reimburse-
ment that parents receive in the form of an income tax credit, particularly if their children attend
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There are a wide range of possible structures for these plans, but
"they share the common element of agreement that greater choice is
desirable in the US [sic] system of education. ' 57 The following sec-
tions describe the choice options in order to acquaint the reader with
the most frequently used terminology and the most common mean-
ings assigned to that terminology. To give some embodiment to the
choice enterprise, specific reference will be made to Ohio legislation
that took effect in July of 1993, proposed legislation currently
before the Ohio legislature, and a current plan on the part of the
Governor to restructure education based on choice in that state.
This section will also comment on school choice in the state of Min-
nesota and private school choice in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
A. Public School Choice
1. Intradistrict Choice Plans
Americans are most familiar with the idea of intradistrict choice.
Typically, the local boards of education determine school attendance
areas and grant parents discretion to select schools anywhere in the
school district. While most districts do not adhere to absolute rigid-
ity in establishing attendance boundaries, policies often vary among
districts within a state.
The Ohio Revised Code, indicative of such state legislation, re-
quires the board of education of each city, locality, and exempted
village school district to adopt an enrollment policy entitling resi-
dent students to attend an "alternative school" in the district. 8 An
"alternative school" is defined as a school building other than the
one to which the district superintendent assigns the student.5 9 The
statute leaves the development of specific policies up to each individ-
ual school district, subject to a myriad of requirements and limita-
tions, especially in regard to student application and admission pro-
cedures.6 0 The statute does not require a student to specifically
make a choice with regard to the school of attendance. Instead, "the
policy . . . require[s] a student to apply only if he wishes to attend
a private school.
57. Henry M. Levin, The Theory of Choice Applied to Education, in CHOICE AND CONTROL
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 247, 248 (William H. Clune et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter Levin, The-
ory of Choice].
58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.97(B)-(F) (Anderson 1990).
59. Id. para. (A)(2).
60. Id. paras. (B)-(F).
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an alternative school." 61 Each district's policy must include informa-
tion about school capacity limits - guaranteeing that students en-
rolled or living in the attendance area of a school will be given pref-
erence over applicants - and procedures to ensure an appropriate
racial balance in the district's schools.62
The Ohio State Board of Education monitors the school districts
and their programs to ensure that policies are not discriminatory. In
selecting students for admission, the statute strictly forbids the use
of criteria such as proficiency in the English language; academic,
athletic, artistic, or other extracurricular ability; or former discipli-
nary records.63 Moreover, a district board cannot place limitations
on the admission of applicants with disabilities. 64 The board can,
however, require a student receiving special education services to at-
tend a school where the services specified in the student's Individu-
alized Education Program are available.6 5
In addition to the above, intradistrict choice options also encom-
pass magnet schools and alternative schools. These options, of
course, have been in existence much longer than the current choice
legislation. They are included in this section, however, because stu-
dent choices are limited to the school district of residence.
a. Magnet Schools
Magnet schools were originally designed to fill the academic
needs of students whom school officials thought were especially well-
qualified in certain subjects, particularly math and science.66 Since
the desegregation activity of the 1960s, one of the major goals of
magnet schools has been to attract a racially diverse student body,
especially if such schools are located in urban areas.6 7 Indeed, re-
search supports the notion that the creation of magnet schools was
meant to foster desegregation in the schools so as to forestall white
61. Id. para. (B)(1).
62. Id. para. (B)(2).
63. Id. paras. (C)(1), (3)-(4).
64. Id. para. (C)(2).
65. Id. The term "Individualized Education Program" ("IEP") is derived from the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (Supp. 1991). An IEP is jointly devel-
oped by school personnel and parents to describe the needs of a student with disabilities and to
prescribe appropriate placement and services to meet those needs.
66. Steven S. Goldberg, Different by Design: The Content and Character of Three Magnet
Schools, 48 W. EDuc. L. REP. 329, 329 (1989) (book review).
67. See Janet R. Price & Jane R. Stern, Magnet Schools as a Strategy for Integration and
School Reform, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 291, 292-93 (1987).
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flight to the suburbs.68 School administrators hence transferred mas-
sive amounts of funds into these projects to support extra programs
not found in other schools in the district in order to provide places
for white staff members. They also placed limits on minority student
enrollment so they would be able to attract enough white students.6 9
Magnet schools offer alternatives to the traditional curriculum and
usually share three primary characteristics: (1) a curriculum
designed around a specific theme or method of instruction; (2) a
select student population and teaching staff; and (3) a student body
drawn from a variety of attendance areas.70
Although proof of the educational effectiveness of such schools is
limited,7' many magnet schools have achieved a goal of racial bal-
ance through voluntary integration.72 However, researchers fault the
validity of the reported academic achievement gains in these schools
because magnet schools typically serve a small percentage of the
student population and often leave the traditional educational sys-
tem intact for the vast majority of students.7 One report concluded
that achievement gains of magnet school students have often been
made at the expense of students in non-magnet schools 4.7  The study
noted that magnet schools have typically pulled the best and the
brightest from school districts and that this has had a negative im-
68. See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 55, at 380; see generally CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL, THE CAR-
ROT OR THE STICK FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY: MAGNET SCHOOLS OR FORCED BUSING
(1990) (focusing on the potential dangers of magnet school systems through an examination of the
failure of one set of New York magnet schools to achieve its goals).
69. Hawkins, supra note 55, at 380.
70. Id.
71. One study has indicated that magnet schools have been quite successful in improving the
achievement of students able to take advantage of this educational option. Rolf K. Blank, Educa-
tional Effects of Magnet High Schools, in 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 77,
93-97, 99-100 (William H. Clune et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter Blank, Educational Effects]. In
his article, Blank discusses the results of the 1983 national study that he helped conduct. See
ROLF K. BLANK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SURVEY OF MAGNET SCHOOLS: ANALYZING A
MODEL FOR QUALITY INTEGRATED EDUCATION (1983) [hereinafter BLANK ET AL., SURVEY OF
MAGNET SCHOOLS].
72. Blank, Educational Effects, supra note 71, at 80 (noting that desegregation plans using
mandatory assignment help to desegregate schools but that voluntary plans maintain higher rates
of integration over time). A national study sponsored by the United States Department of Educa-
tion examined more than 45 magnet schools in fifteen school districts and revealed that 40 percent
of the districts were effective in achieving voluntary desegregation. BLANK ET AL., SURVEY OF
MAGNET SCHOOLS, supra note 71, at 32. Blank and his colleagues also found that large urban
school districts that were gaining in population and were multi-racial and multi-ethnic were most
successful in achieving desegregation. Id. at 86-87.
73. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 209.
74. DONALD R. MOORE & SUZANNE DAVENPORT, THE NEW IMPROVED SORTING MACHINE
100-104 (1989) [hereinafter MOORE & DAVENPORT, SORTING MACHINE].
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pact on non-magnet schools."' Moreover, minority children from
low-income backgrounds who may not have scored as high as other
students on standardized tests are often unable to enroll in such
schools. Even if they can gain admission, they are sometimes segre-
gated within the magnet school itself.7"
b. Alternative Schools
Alternative schools originated by and large in the 1960s as a way
of promoting independent decision-making in public school students
and to "increase the participation of minorit[y persons] in all phases
of public school life."'77 The phrase "alternative schools" is a broad
term and is generally perceived to define any school offering exper-
iences different from those of conventional public schools.7 How-
ever, such institutions are known particularly for educating students
"who have attendance or disciplinary problems, who are potential or
actual dropouts, or who have severe difficulty in mastering basic
skills."179
Such schools provide positive evidence of decreasing drop-out
rates, truancy, and class attendance problems.80 Evidence of student
participation in such schools also demonstrates the development of
greater positive self concepts and the learning of basic and voca-
tional skills.8" There is also evidence, though, of the segregation of
students and the fact that there may be very little difference be-
tween the teaching methods and techniques used in alternative
schools and those used in more conventional schools.8 2
2. Interdistrict Choice Plans
Interdistrict choice generally offers parents the opportunity to
send their children to another school district in the resident state
subject to the following restrictions: (1) the transfer does not ad-
versely affect desegregation mandates; (2) the receiving district
agrees to accept nonresident students; and (3) the receiving district
75. Id.
76. Hawkins, supra note 55, at 381.
77. ERIC/CUE: Alternative Schools - Some Answers and Questions, 14 URBAN REVIEW 65,
65 (1982).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 66.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 67.
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has available space within its schools. For example, Ohio law re-
quires the board of education of each city, locality, and exempted
village school district to adopt a resolution pertaining to enrollment
of students from "adjacent" school districts."3 An "adjacent" school
district is one that "abuts the territory of [the] district adopting
[the] resolution." '84 The statute also states, however, that a school
district in the state must choose to "either entirely prohibit the en-
rollment of students from all adjacent districts or permit enrollment
of students from all adjacent districts in accordance with a policy
contained in the resolution. 85 This latter statement gives the indi-
vidual school district the discretion to choose whether or not to par-
ticipate in the interdistrict choice program.
Minnesota's interdistrict program is one of "open enrollment,"
meaning that all students may attend any public school in the state
(subject to certain specified restrictions 6) and that state funding
will follow the student to any school he or she chooses to attend. 7
Minnesota was the first state in the country to legislatively mandate
a statewide open enrollment program. The juxtaposition of the Ohio
and Minnesota statutes demonstrates the variations on the theme of
interdistrict choice. Such choice in Ohio is "cluster choice" involv-
ing only contiguous school districts, while in Minnesota the entire
state is one school district. Moreover, in Ohio, participation in in-
terdistrict choice is optional at the district level, whereas in Minne-
sota all school districts must develop such a program, although they
may choose not to admit any transfer students. 8
Ohio's procedural requirements for interdistrict admission parallel
83. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.98 (Anderson 1990).
84. Id. para. (A)(3). There are categorical differences between interdistrict choice programs in
Ohio and that of other interdistrict choice states such as Minnesota and Nebraska. In Ohio, this
choice option can be described best as "cluster choice," in that the student may only seek applica-
tion to a public school district within a certain coterminous geographic boundary. Interdistrict
choice in the other states mentioned is best defined as "open enrollment," where students may
attend any school within the state. See MINN. STAT. § 120.062 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
1435.02 (1992).
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.98(B) (Anderson 1990).
86. MINN. STAT. §120.062 subd. 7 (1993). A student wishing to attend a school located outside
their resident district must apply to that nonresident district. Each district's board must adopt, by
resolution, specific standards for acceptance and rejection of these applications. These standards
may include the capacity of the program, class, grade, level, or school building. Id.; see also id.
subd. 5(f) (allowing a district to reject applications in order to comply with a district's desegrega-
tion plan).
87. Id. § 120.062. Open enrollment is not necessarily limited to interdistrict choice, as it also
contains intradistrict options.
88. Cf. Id. subd. 7 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313 (Anderson 1990).
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the language of Ohio's intradistrict choice legislation; students living
in the district receive preference over those outsiders seeking enroll-
ment, and outsiders already matriculating receive preference over
first-time applicants.89 Choice is further limited by the fact that
school districts cannot have a policy discouraging or prohibiting its
resident students from applying to an adjacent school district with
an interdistrict policy unless such transfers would negatively affect
the racial balance in the resident district.90 Ohio does not, however,
set guidelines for maintaining the racial balance required in the leg-
islation governing the intradistrict or interdistrict choice programs.
A school district enrolling nonresident students under interdistrict
choice in Ohio receives additional funds in an amount equal to the
state minimum expenditure formula.91 In Minnesota, as in Ohio,
choice aid to students comes mainly from the state. Both states set a
dollar amount which moves with the student to the nonresident dis-
trict. 92 Given the wide disparity in expenditure patterns of districts
in both states, interdistrict choice could be a boon for rich districts
and a bust for poor ones.9 3
Prior to the enactment of choice legislation, Ohio law required
school districts to provide transportation to resident pupils enrolled
in kindergarten through eighth grade living more than two miles
from school." The school board could provide transportation to high
school students at any distance, but was not required to do so.95 The
current choice legislation mandates transportation for those ac-
cepted students who are living outside the district.96 This transporta-
tion provision is similar to Minnesota's, which only requires the re-
ceiving district to provide transportation to such transferees within
the receiving district's boundaries.97 This means students living
outside the district must find some alternative method of transporta-
89. See OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.98(B)(2)(b) (Anderson 1990).
90. OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3301-48-01 to -02 (1990).
91. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.981 (Anderson 1990). This amount was roughly $2,800
during the 1992-93 school year. State tax dollars that would have normally gone to the sending
district and local property taxes from that sending district supply the funds for such a formula. Id.
§ 3317.021 (Anderson Supp. 1992).
92. MINN. STAT. § 123.3514 (1993).
93. KERN ALEXANDER & RICHARD G. SALMON, FISCAL EQUITY OF THE OHIO SYSTEM OF PUB-
LIC SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE COALITION OF RURAL AND APPALACHIAN SCHOOLS 15-17
(1990) (copy on file with the author).
94. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3327.01 (Anderson 1990).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 3313.981 (Anderson Supp. 1992).
97. MINN. STAT. § 120.062 subd. 9 (1993).
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tion to get to the borders of the receiving district. Both states per-
ceived the potential for an equal protection argument brought by
low-income students and added a provision reimbursing below-pov-
erty-level parents for transportation between home and the nonresi-
dent school.98
Even though many states have enacted this form of choice legisla-
tion, 9 most reports indicate that only a minimal number of students
are actually changing districts."' 0 Drawbacks to this type of legisla-
tion include funding and transportation problems. State funding for
schools is determined by the number of students in a district, as well
as by the cost of schooling in that district. Thus, school board offi-
cials are less inclined to promote interdistrict choice for fear of los-
ing students and needed state funding. 01 Many states are similar to
Minnesota in that they place the cost and responsibility of trans-
porting students from outside the school district on the parents. 102
This financial burden may well discourage many parents from tak-
ing advantage of this option.
3. Postsecondary Enrollment Options
Ohio, like other states, has a postsecondary enrollment options
plan which gives high school juniors and seniors the opportunity to
take nonsectarian courses for credit at any state-assisted college or
university authorized to award degrees under the aegis of the
state. ' The program creates more options for students who wish
either to accelerate their high school program or expand the pro-
gram to include course work not available in the high school curric-
ulum. Students may enroll in such courses as long as the number of
classes does not exceed the equivalent of a high school course
load.' Each high school determines how much credit each course is
worth, and students must declare whether the courses are being
taken for high school or college credit. 0 5
98. Id.: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.981 (Anderson Supp. 1992).
99. See infra Appendix A (detailing the choice legislation available in each state).
100. Elaine M. McGillivray, The New Minnesota Miracle?: A Critique of Open Enrollment in
Minnesota's Public Schools, II HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 105, 113 (1990).
101. JOHN F. WITTE, CHOICE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 21 (1990).
102. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (detailing the scheme set forth under the
Minnesota statute); see also infra Appendix A (summarizing school choice legislation throughout
the country).
103. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3365.01-.10 (Anderson 1990).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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4. Charter Schools
Most charter school plans allow teachers or other interested citi-
zens to apply for a state charter to establish a public school. Ohio
has no such legislation. Minnesota, however, was the first state to
pioneer this idea with its "Outcome-Based School Act" of 1991.16
The charter schools in Minnesota ostensibly provide opportunities
for classroom teachers to engage in innovative techniques and cur-
riculum development. 10 7 In addition, local school boards can propose
charter schools that must, in turn, be approved by the state board of
education.108 Only licensed teachers may form or operate such
schools, and teachers must constitute a majority of the charter
school's board of directors. 10 9 Finally, charter schools may not
charge tuition and cannot be affiliated with religious or nonpublic
sectarian institutions.10
B. Private School Choice
Private choice is the promotion of market forces within the educa-
tional enterprise providing public tax dollars to pay for private edu-
cation. Typically, the funding for such plans comes either in the
form of vouchers or tuition tax credits.
1. Voucher Systems
Educational vouchers are based on economic theories of market-
place supply and demand. Milton Friedman, an economist and the
modern architect of vouchers, proposed an unregulated voucher
model in the mid 1950s." 1 Under his plan, all parents would receive
vouchers equal to the cost of educating a child in the public school
system, but schools - both public and private - could charge
whatever tuition the market would bear. 2 Parents who desired
more expensive schools could supplement the value of the voucher.
Under Friedman's plan, education would become a consumer item
similar to any other commodity. 113
106. See MINN. STAT. § 120.064(1) (1993).
107. Id. subd. (I)(4).
108. Id. subd. (4)(b).
109. Id. subd. (4)(c).
110. Id. subds. (8)(c), (e).
111. See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 14.
112. Id. at 89.
113. Id. at 93.
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Under a modern voucher plan, all parents would receive a
voucher for a designated amount per school-age dependent. Parents
could apply these vouchers to the cost of education at any approved
public or private educational facility.114 The amount of the voucher
would be based on the total amount of public funds available for
education divided by the number of school age children. Private
schools, however, could set tuition costs higher than the amount pro-
vided by the state vouchers, meaning that parents selecting the pri-
vate schools would have to cover the extra costs.11 5 Both public and
private schools, therefore, would compete in the marketplace for
students.
a. Ohio
Ohio has no current legislation involving publicly-funded vouchers
for private schools. There are, however, three new bills before the
legislature that have vouchers as their base.11' House Bill 635 would
create a five-year pilot program permitting "at-risk" students to at-
tend private and sectarian schools.1 7 House Bill 825 is duplicative
of House Bill 635, except that it would require a participating secta-
rian school to issue a statement that students are not compelled to
adhere to any specific religion.11 8 House Bill 851 would submit the
question of overall private and sectarian school participation in the
voucher program to the electorate for an upcoming referendum. 9
House Bills 635 and 825 delineate the state program for distribu-
tion of the vouchers. They provide direct allocation of tuition to par-
ents in an amount equal to the per-pupil cost to educate a student in
the district where he or she is domiciled. 120 Parents would be able to
use the vouchers at a public, private, or sectarian school.' 2'
In late 1992, a commission organized by the Governor of Ohio
prepared a report calling for a voucher system that would give stu-
114. See generally Robert J. Bruno, Constitutional Analysis of Educational Vouchers in Min-
nesota, 53 W. EDUC. L. REP. 9 (June 22, 1989) (analyzing the constitutional issues raised by
Minnesota's attempt at voucher legislation under the Education Choice Demonstration Project).
115. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 14, at 89.
116. See 1992 Ohio H.B. 635, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1992); 1992
Ohio H.B. 825, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (July 15, 1992); 1992 Ohio H.B. 851,
119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Aug. 28, 1992).
117. 1992 Ohio H.B. 635.
118. 1992 Ohio H.B. 825 para. (D)(5).
119. 1992 Ohio H.B. 851.
120. 1992 Ohio H.B. 635 para. (C); 1992 Ohio H.B. 825 paras. (C)(l)-(2).
121. 1992 Ohio H.B. 635 para. (C); 1992 Ohio H.B. 825 paras. (C)(l)-(2).
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dents the ability to choose freely among public and private
schools.122 This school deregulation plan proposes education vouch-
ers of between $1,600 and $3,000 depending on grade level, with the
greatest amount of funds at the highest grades.123 Under the plan,
any public or accredited private school would be eligible for the
voucher program. 2 4 The voucher plan is consistent with either an
open admissions or restricted admissions policy.
Under the proposed open admissions policy, a public school must
prioritize admissions based on: (1) students returning from the pre-
ceding year; (2) a requirement whereby up to 20 percent of the stu-
dent body must be from low-income groups; and (3) all other stu-
dents once the first two categories are satisfied. 125 The proposal also
stipulates that there can not be discrimination based on race, gen-
der, or creed, 26 a statement which seems rather obvious when one
talks of public schools. The proposal would permit discrimination
against learning-disabled students, however, in that school districts
would not be "required to [admit such students] unless . . . [there
are] facilities sufficient to deal with the learning disabled child that
is applying. 1 27
Like public schools, participating private sectarian schools that
opted for open admissions under the Ohio proposal would also be
required to use the low-income requirement of 20 percent of the stu-
dent body as a priority for student enrollment. This is somewhat
muted, however, by the fact that first priority may go to members of
the religious sect or church organization sponsoring the school.' 28
The document contains no language pertaining to race, gender,
creed, or disability with regard to private, sectarian schools and
open admissions. This presumably means such schools would be free
to discriminate against such persons in their admissions policies.
In addition to the open admissions policy, the Ohio Scholarship
Plan would also allow a restricted admissions policy. 129 However,
even under a restricted admissions policy, private schools would not
122. OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4.
123. Id. at 6.
124. fd.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 6-7.
129. Id. at 5, 7.
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be able to discriminate based on a student's race. 130 The plan does,
however, specifically permit gender discrimination. 131 Also, one may
assume it permits disability discrimination from its lack of mention.
The language of the proposed restricted admissions policy also de-
notes that a qualifying private school could "require attendance at,
but not participation in, religious activities of a school."' 32 Public
school districts would also be able to establish a restricted admis-
sions program for magnet schools located within their geographic
boundaries.' 33
The proposed Ohio plan goes a step further than most states in
reference to the regulation of private schools by state-based educa-
tional governing boards. Specifically, if a private school chose to
participate in this voucher program, student achievement would be
determined through the use of a uniform test administered to all
public schools and based on a national standard. Until the develop-
ment of such a uniform exam, all participating schools would mea-
sure student progress using the Ohio Proficiency Test. 34
Whether the Ohio Legislature enacts either the aforementioned
House Bills, the Ohio Scholarship Plan, or a combination of the
two, profound legal implications with respect to discrimination
based on race and disability will follow. In particular, if provisions
regarding student attendance at religious functions of the participat-
ing private schools and government regulations based on proficiency
test mandates are enacted, they may violate the Establishment
Clause. The Legal Issues section of this article will address these
topics.
b. Wisconsin
Wisconsin became the only state in the nation with a private
school choice program when its legislature passed the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program in 1990.1"5 This pilot program enables up
to one percent of a school district's low-income students to attend
private, nonsectarian schools while the state pays participating
schools approximately $2,500 for each student enrolled under the
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 10.
135. See WIs, STAT. § 119.23 (1990).
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program. 136 General school allocations that would otherwise be paid
to Milwaukee public schools provide the funds for the program.137
To remain eligible for the program, participating private schools
must meet at least one of the following standards established for
program accountability: (1) at least 70 percent of the pupils in the
program must advance one grade level each year; (2) the private
school's average attendance rate for the students in the program
must be at least 90 percent; (3) at least 80 percent of the students
in the program must demonstrate significant academic progress; or
(4) at least 70 percent of the families in the program must meet
parental involvement criteria established by the private school. 38
These minimal criteria have been the source of great criticism from
authors who suggest that these criteria possess the potential for
great abuse."3 9 For example, during 1990 many of the participating
schools used student attendance as the quality control mechanism
while only one used the element of academic progress. Moreover,
the state board of education has no evaluation procedure for deter-
mining if any of the schools are actually meeting the minimum stan-
dards listed above.' 40
In March of 1992, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
process which lead to the passage of the voucher program was con-
stitutional.141 The state superintendent of public instruction as well
as numerous amici 142 had challenged the process. The court reversed
the appellate court, ruling that the legislation creating the voucher
program did not violate the doctrine of spending state money for the
public good. 43 In its opinion, the court noted that "[slufficient safe-
guards are included in the program to ensure that participating pri-
vate schools are under adequate governmental supervision reasona-
136. Id. para. (2)(b).
137. Id. para. (5)(a).
138. Id. para. (7)(a).
139. See, e.g., Julie K. Underwood, Choice is Not a Panacea, 71 W. EDUC. L. REP. 599, 602-
605 (1992) (analyzing whether "the [liegislature can spend funds for a public purpose without
assurances that the public purpose will be served.").
140. Id. at 604-605.
141. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 477 (Wis. 1992).
142. Amici joining in the case were the Wisconsin Association of School District Administra-
tors, Inc., the Wisconsin Education Association Council, the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, the Association of Wisconsin School Administrators, the Milwaukee
Teachers Education Association, the Wisconsin Congress of Parents and Teachers, Inc., the Mil-
waukee Administrators and Supervisors Council, and the Wisconsin Federation of Teachers. See
Davis v. Grover, 464 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d at 472-73.
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bly necessary under the circumstances to attain the public purpose
of improving educational quality."' 44 Additionally, the court ruled
that the program met the state's uniformity requirement because it
"in no way deprives any student the opportunity to attend a public
school with a uniform character of education. Even those students
participating in the program may withdraw at any time and return
to a public school."' 5 The court's ruling proved to be negatively
prophetic, as the Milwaukee program encountered problems. when
introducing private school choice absent public accountability: one
of the pilot schools was forced to shut down in the first year of the
plan's operation.' 46 This had a devastating effect on the children in
that school.1 47
2. Tax Credits and Deductions
Another strategy designed to increase parental choice in educa-
tional decisions affecting children is to provide income tax relief for
the costs associated with private schooling. Under a tax credit plan,
parents whose children attend private schools take all or part of the
educational expenses as a tax credit.
In 1973, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute
that, in part, permitted parents to deduct from their adjusted gross
incomes (for state income tax purposes) a designated amount for
each dependent for whom they paid at least fifty dollars in nonpub-
lic school tuition. 48 Concluding that the law rewarded parents for
sending children to private, primarily parochial schools, the Court
held the law advanced religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 1'9 The statute provided aid to parents who sent their chil-
dren to private schools, and there was no mechanism in place to
guarantee that state money would not be used for religious
purposes. 50
In 1983, however, the Supreme Court in Mueller v. Allen' up-
held a Minnesota tax benefit program entitling parents of public or
private school students to claim state income tax deductions up to a
144. Id. at 463.
145. Id. at 474.
146. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 18.
147. Id.
148. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
149. Id. at 798.
150. Id. at 780.
151. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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designated ceiling for educational expenses. 152 Distinguishing the
Minnesota program from the New York provision that bestowed
benefits only on parents of private school students, the Court de-
clared that "[a] State's decision to defray the cost of educational
expenses incurred by parents - regardless of the type of school
their children attend - evidences a purpose that is both secular and
understandable. ' 153 The Court reasoned that such aid does not have
the primary effect of advancing religion, and noted that most deci-
sions where the Court struck down state aid to parochial schools
involved the direct transmission of public funds to private schools. 15
The Court found the Minnesota scheme to be facially neutral be-
cause it was a deduction permitted for all parents whether their
children were in public or private school. The Court further noted
that the assistance went directly to the parents and only indirectly
to the school.' 55
Although the holding in Mueller supports school choice, some
have used the decision to promote a voucher system rather than tax
credits. Mueller stands for the principle that direct payments to par-
ents rather than to schools may prevent a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause, because the payments can be used to pay for educa-
tion in a secular school.' 56 Another potential problem facing a tax
credit scheme, however, is one of equal protection; tax benefits may
only aid those parents who have a sufficiently high tax liability.
Low-income families would be less likely to profit from such a pro-
gram and might even be constructively ineligible for the credit.'57
This makes education vouchers the more popular of the two private
choice plans because vouchers provide all parents with a "scholar-
152. Id. at 404.
153. Id. at 395.
154. Id. at 398.
155. Id. at 396-99.
156. Id. See also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). In that case,
the Court held that the Establishment Clause was not violated where a public employee was
placed in a sectarian school to serve as an interpreter for a deaf student pursuant to the regula-
tions contained in the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
85 (1993). Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469. However, the Court then noted in a footnote that there
would have been no issue at all had the IDEA funds been disbursed directly to the student's
parents, who then could have used the funds to pay the interpreter themselves. Id. n. 11. This
footnote has obvious implications for any choice-based voucher plan which includes private, secta-
rian schools.
157. Possible reasons include the fact that low-income families might not have enough income
to make use of the deduction, or that the tax scheme might involve an itemized deduction, and
low-income families typically do not itemize their deductions.
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ship" that travels with the student regardless of the family's socio-
economic background.
Tuition vouchers and tax credits, apparently intended to create a
marketplace of choice, have been faulted as jeopardizing the overall
welfare of the American public school system because they transfer
funds out of an enterprise already in serious financial trouble. This
line of reasoning leads to the obvious conclusion that a choice plan
could perpetuate a class strata by keeping low-income students in
low-income schools. In addition, vouchers and tax credits permit, to
a degree, private schools to receive more of the public dollar without
having to submit to public regulation or having to accept many of
the students that public schools must educate. A lack of accounta-
bility may cause problems for low-income students even when they
are the target of these forms of choice legislation. The next section
of this article addresses these criticisms as well as others.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE PLANS
Parental choice, especially when it involves private schools, serves
as one of the more hotly debated issues in education today. Until
recently, the debate has been highly theoretical due to the absence
of empirical studies evaluating both theories and programs. This
section of the article will continue some of that theoretical discus-
sion, but it will also note the work of empirical studies conducted to
date. Much of the empirical information emanates from analysis of
pro-choice reports such as the Chubb and Moe study. To delineate
the colloquy, this section will examine parental choice under topics
that are prominent among the theorists: school competition, student
achievement, equitable concerns regarding low income students, and
the right of parents to choose the schools their children attend.1 5 8
A. Competition
The values embodied in economic competition underlie most
school choice legislation. As early as 1974, Peter Drucker argued
158. Commentators have evaluated parental choice statutes under the rubrics of "competition"
and "student achievement" in other state-based studies. See, e.g., C. Lee Cusenbary, Jr., Educa-
tional Choice Legislation After Edgewood v. Kirby: A Proposal for Clearing the Sectarian Hur-
dle, 23 ST. MARY'S 1-1,269 (1991) (analyzing the conflict raised by free choice between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment); Allan E. Parker, Jr., Public
Free Schools: A Constitutional Right to Educational Choice in Texas, 45 Sw. L.J. 825 (1991)
(analyzing the constitutionality of Texas's educational choice plan).
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that educational institutions, like other government service institu-
tions, are ineffective due to the way they are funded. 159 According
to Drucker, leaders in business recognize that satisfying the cus-
tomer is the only way to guarantee continued existence and growth
of the company. 16  However, others point out that involuntary taxes
consistently fund public schools. Regardless of whether they satisfy
student needs or perform effectively in the process, public schools
still collect a major share of tax dollars to stay in "business."'' As
the argument goes, this type of funding situation, absent choice leg-
islation, results in a "captive audience" regardless of the school's
performance or its responsiveness to children and parents." 2
This latter set of comments also forms the basis of the most
widely-quoted work on school choice, Politics, Markets and
America's Schools, by John Chubb and Terry Moe. 6 3 These au-
thors believe that schools driven by the market place are more effec-
tive than those under public control. 6' They argue that deregulating
the public school system will create a highly differentiated set of
offerings for students and will lead to greater efficiency, thereby of-
fering a better educational product.'6 5 They accuse public school
systems of being complacent, lethargic, inefficient, and unresponsive
to the needs of most students. They argue that only by providing
greater choice to parents in a pure market situation involving public
and private schools can the quality of education in the United States
ever improve.' 6
Using the Chubb and Moe thesis, many state legislatures have
enacted educational choice legislation. 6 7 As a general rule, such
states have left intact the ability of educational organizations to use
tax dollars to support education. Furthermore., local school authori-
159. PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT 131-33 (1974).
160. Id.
161. See generally Philip K. Porter & Michael L. Davis, The Value of Private Property in
Education: Innovation, Production and Employment, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397, 413-16
(1991) (arguing that the American educational system would be greatly improved if the govern-
ment was removed from the supply side of the education market and all schools were privately
owned and operated).
162. Remarks of President Bush to the Lehigh Valley 2000 Community, PUB. PAPERS 609, 612
(Apr. 16, 1992) ("When our students are a captive audience, our schools have no incentive to
improve.").
163. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6.
164. Id. at 206-18.
165. Id. at 216-17.
166. Id.
167. See infra Appendix A (surveying the choice legislation available in each state).
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ties have been able to maintain authority to seek additional local tax
dollars through referenda. Choice advocates seek a variation of this
arrangement by supporting the right of parents to choose a school,
inside or outside the district, with public funds supporting the stu-
dent. The economic theory of supply and demand, therefore, sug-
gests that state funds would continue to enable these school districts
to meet consumers' demands. If the state were to adopt a completely
free-market approach to educational choice, this theory says, it
would force public schools to be more responsive to the needs of
parents and students. As a result, schools would provide more desir-
able educational services. Conversely, schools that did not meet
these demands would either have to improve educational programs
or go out of business.1 68
Detractors of this competition theory indicate that the experience
of business can hardly serve as a model for the public school system
to do its job.'6 ' They state that the work of Chubb and Moe, as well
as that of other researchers, provides little in the way of evidence
that marketplace justice will improve school processes or increase
efficiency. In fact, such detractors indicate that the marketplace is
often indifferent to the needs of certain people, particularly low-in-
come groups, because they can be "manipulated through fraud and
false advertising.' ' 7 0 Stated another way, educational choice can
never operate as a pure market because the seller of the service gets
to choose the students and may charge different prices for services
to discriminate on the basis of religion, race, disability, or any other
arbitrarily chosen reason.'
Detractors of the competition theory also state that markets do
not operate naturally, but rather are socially constructed. Moreover,
gambling in free markets for profit is one thing, but playing stocks
with a child's education is quite another. Hence, the business model
is not one for the education of the general public, as its private
structures are incongruent with the public challenges. 72
168. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 216-17; see also FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM,
supra note 14, at 93 (stating that the injection of competition into the education marketplace will
stimulate the development and improvement of all schools).
169. Cookson, supra note 27, at 158.
170. Id.
171. EDUCATION COMM. OF THE PENN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT PERTAINING TO
"SCHOOL CHOICE" 15 (Dec. 10, 1991) (Ronald R. Cowell, Chair) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA
REPORT].
172. Id.; see also Wells, supra note 21, at 137 (noting that political institutions actively pro-
mote and protect over-bureaucratization).
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Indeed, the notion of a pure competitive model in education ig-
nores the fact that it is practically obligatory for every state and
local government to provide a system of public education. 73 There
will always be students for whom public, non-magnet education is
the only alternative. Hence, as a matter of public policy, it would be
difficult to create a constitutionally supportable option of closing
schools when the government's obligation is to ensure a viable, free
educational program to which all students have access. Where inad-
equate education exists, the state's duty is to improve rather than
abandon.
B. Student Achievement
At the center of the school choice revolution is the position that
competition among schools will not only promote efficiency, but will
have the corollary effect of vastly improving student academic
achievement. Chubb and Moe, for example, argue that student
achievement can be enhanced by the injection of market competi-
tion. 74 Market theory drives this attitude, since its basis is the view
that public schools have a monopoly on education, and that monopo-
lies are devoid of pressure to operate efficiently. Specifically, Chubb
and Moe state that parents should be further empowered, with the
help of the state, to choose schools for their children; thus, parents
will choose schools .of higher academic quality, and this will in turn
coerce schools of inferior quality to either provide better service or
cease to exist. 75
Chubb and Moe condemn the current public school enterprise,
claiming that current student achievement is a function of school
organization and the structure of the school. 76 The public school
system has as its foundation the notion of shared governance be-
tween the state, the school board, parents, teachers, and other school
personnel. Therefore, public schools suffer from bureaucratic con-
trol. and this in and of itself inhibits student achievement. 77 Chubb
and Moe state that the current system also diminishes school
achievement because a democratic system of politics promotes cen-
173. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that education is "per-
haps the most important function of state and local governments.").
174. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 226.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 125-37.
177. Id. at 35-46.
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tralized bureaucratic control and inhibits the autonomy of front-line
administrators.178 Market choice, by contrast, is by nature decen-
tralized, and this independence from democratic politics and bu-
reaucracy fosters the development of organizational characteristics
necessary for greater student achievement. Such organizational
characteristics include varied and up to date academic programs,
teacher creativity, high levels of teacher and administrative profes-
sionalism, increased discipline, and greater independent thinking on
the part of students.1 79
Anyone concerned about the welfare of public education in the
United States can not overlook Chubb and Moe's arguments.
Whether or not their arguments have merit or persuade legislators,
public education is in great peril. If it is true that student achieve-
.ment is a function of school organization and such public school or-
ganization is incapable of promoting this achievement, the door will
open for pundits to openly call for the absence of shared governance
in schooling and to collapse the boundary between public and pri-
vate schooling.
Chubb and Moe based their viewpoint on data gathered from two
surveys. 80 Using this information, Chubb and Moe determined that
school organization is one of four significant variables affecting stu-
dent achievement, as measured by increases in standardized test
scores from the sophomore to the senior year in high school.' 8' The
other three significant variables were: (1) the student's ability at the
sophomore year; (2) the socioeconomic status of the student's fam-
ily; and (3) the socioeconomic status of the student body.'82 They
surmised from this data that well-organized schools with clear aca-
demic goals, strong educational leadership, and ambitious programs
can make a meaningful difference in student achievement, and that
this is comparable in importance to a student's background. 83
178. Id.
179. Id. at 215-18.
180. Id. at 22. Chubb and Moe combined data from The High School and Beyond Survey
("HS&B") and the Administrator and Teacher Stirvey ("A&TS"). CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6,
at 22. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE HIGH SCHOOL AND BEYOND SURVEY
(1980) [hereinafter HIGH SCHOOL AND BEYOND SURVEY]; NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATIS-
TICS, THE HIGH SCHOOL AND BEYOND 1980 SOPHOMORE COHORT FIRST FOLLOW-UP SURVEY
(1982); NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IM-
PROVEMENT, THE HIGH SCHOOL AND BEYOND ADMINISTRATOR AND TEACHER SURVEY (1984).
181. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 116-18.
182. Id. at 118-23.
183. Id. at 123.
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Curiously, the authors did not discuss the correlation between the
other variables, such as the student's sophomore year ability, family
socioeconomic status, and the socioeconomic status of the student
body. Because of this and other inconsistencies, critical analyses of
their work began to appear. Early on, John Witte examined the data
in The High School and Beyond Survey ("HS&B"),8 " one of the
surveys relied on by Chubb and Moe."8 5 Witte surveyed the statisti-
cal models, findings, and interpretations as well as the insights de-
rived from that data set. He concluded that studies from it provide
no useful information for the debate on school choice because re-
ported differences in achievement between the schools in the set are
de minimis, and that even these differences could be accounted for
by measurement errors. 18
Henry Levin also examined Chubb and Moe's statistical analysis
of the HS&B study.187 He found that although the Chubb and Moe
study was "arcane and incomprehensible to the vast public audi-
ence," it nevertheless "succeeded in creating the perception that
their conclusions were based on scientific findings. '"188 Levin instead
postulated that the authors' findings were based on "tendentious
reasoning and personal opinion that passed for analysis."1 9 Another
author, David Hogan, joined Levin in questioning the integrity of
the Chubb and Moe research. 190 Hogan stood incredulous that the
variables of student ability at the sophomore year, socioeconomic
status of the family, and the socioeconomic status of the student
body were left out of the analysis relative to student achievement. 1 '
Hogan saw this as "academic alchemy," since such variables figure
so prominently in the work of the authors who created the data set
in the first place. '92 Hogan viewed this as a serious conceptual and
methodological flaw which undermines the credibility of the position
184. HIGH SCHOOL AND BEYOND SURVEY, supra note 180.
185. See John F. Witte, Private School Versus Public School Achievement: Are There Find-
ings That Should Affect the Education Choice Debate?, II ECON. oF EDUC. REV. 371 (1992)
(concluding that there is little evidence in HS&B that has any policy relevance for educational
choice).
186. Id. at 387-91.
187. See Levin, Vouchers and School Choice, supra note 20.
188. Id. at 283.
189. Id. at 281.
190. David Hogan, School Organization and Student Achievement: A Review Essay, 42 EDUC.
THEORY 83, 100-104 (1992).
191. Id. at 100.
192. Id. at 100-101.
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that student achievement is a function of school organization. 9 '
Anthony Bryk and Valerie Lee, who used the same HS&B data,
concluded that Chubb and Moe took unwarranted liberties in defin-
ing key concepts and in creating analytical models that the data did
not justify. 94 They postulated that the effect of this activity was to
skew the results of the data to a particular outcome. They concluded
that this kind of work is intellectually irresponsible, as it supplants a
critical, disinterested analysis with a position nurtured by partisan
politics.195
Finally, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teach-
ing completed a 118-page report which surveyed school districts and
parents concerning the issue of school choice.1 96 Pointing to student
achievement, the study demonstrated that the impact of choice pro-
grams is ambiguous at best. 97 While there was some small evidence
of a correlation in district-wide programs, there was no such connec-
tion at the statewide level. Furthermore, although the essence of
school choice for most proponents is that competition will stimulate
academic programs, the survey offered little evidence of this notion.
Of the states with competitive open enrollment legislation, no educa-
tional gains were attributable to parental choice.' 98
C. Race, Class, and Choice
Supporters of educational choice also argue that it enables chil-
dren of low-income and minority families to achieve educational eq-
uity and opportunities previously denied them because of their eco-
nomic status. The rationale is that such students are victims of
neighborhood schools because they must deal with an intellectually
starved curriculum, a disproportionate track, and the stigma of be-
ing less-capable learners. Choice proponents suggest that if given
innovative choices, parents will elect to leave these neighborhood
schools for more effective options. Consequently, the neighborhood
schools will be held more accountable.
Chubb and Moe are once again the progenitors of this idea.
193. Id.
194. Anthony S. Bryk & Valerie E. Lee, Is Politics the Problem and Markets the Answer? An
Essay Review of Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, 11 ECON. OF EDUC. REv. 439, 440-41,
443 (1992).
195. Id. at 448-49.
196. See CARNEGIE REPORT. supra note 42.
197. Id. at 16, 20, 22.
198. Id.
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Through parent choice, low-income parents would have the alterna-
tives wealthy parents have always enjoyed: public, private, secular,
or sectarian schools.' 99 They propose a voucher system, keyed to pa-
rental income, that would prohibit parents from subsidizing the
vouchers with "add-on" dollars but enable the state government to
uniformly supplement the vouchers through the raising of taxes."'
These measures answer the concern of those who advocate equaliz-
ing the financial footing of all children regardless of socioeconomic
status. Far from dispossessing economically disadvantaged families,
supporters argue that choice programs would empower these fami-
lies as never before. 1
One can hardly deny that the criticism of the public schools in
connection with minority and low-income children is absolutely true.
Public schools discriminate. In fact, the Supreme Court had to ar-
rest state policies authorizing the separation of black and white chil-
dren. 2 School administrators and teachers have actually stifled the
efforts of poor and minority students to achieve academic parity
with other students.2 0 3 Even now the disciplinary procedures in pub-
lic schools appear to be differentially applied between poor minority
and more wealthy white students.20 4 The question is whether educa-
tional choice has demonstrated any amelioration of this and whether
poor families who do not do well in the job and housing markets will
become winners in a deregulated education market.
The research of equity advocates, however, seems devoid of any
specific evidence that choice will better the situation of minority and
low-income students. In fact, the empirical evidence indicates just
the opposite.2 05 There is little proof that private schools and subur-
ban public schools readily accept minority children from the city
even when choice is an option. There is greater evidence that white
students are better able to use choice to transfer from integrated
199. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 6, at 219-20.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
203. See generally Daniel, supra note 22 (providing a history of discrimination against black
students in Chicago schools).
204. See Philip T.K. Daniel & Karen Bond Coriell, Suspension and Expulsion in America's
Public Schools: Has Unfairness Resulted From a Narrowing of Due Process?, 13 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 3-5, 32-34 (1992) (criticizing suspension and expulsion as discriminatory
methods of maintaining order in the classroom).
205. James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 259 (1991) (reviewing CHUBB
& MOE. supra note 6).
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urban schools to all-white suburban schools.2"6 Moreover, urban
choice appears to exacerbate social divisions because middle class
students have disproportionate access to the best public schools. n7
In the San Francisco magnet school program, for example, schools
recruit students from the highest socioeconomic level, ultimately re-
sulting in an "unintentional two-tiered school system. '2 0 8 Finally,
choice legislation is unlikely to give a student enough money to at-
tend a private school of his or her choice. In contrast to the Chubb
and Moe proposal, suggested choice programs do not contemplate a
voucher for the full cost of private tuition.20 9 This would do little to
help poor parents because they would be forced to make up the dif-
ference out of family funds. Such a proposal seems rather naive, if
not disingenuous.
Choice supporters tout the experience of the East Harlem schools
in New York City as a successful example of school choice. This is
because it was the first such program in the country210 and because,
over the past twenty years, the area has raised itself from being
dead last on proficiency tests (compared to the rest of the city) to a
level approximating the city-wide average. 211 An understanding of
the demographics of the area is important to fully comprehend the
magnitude of the accomplishment. There are approximately 14,000
students in the district,21 80 percent of whom are eligible for free or
reduced lunch programs. 2 1  Ninety-five percent of the children are
either African-American or hispanic. Before reform came to the dis-
trict, there was a tremendous gang problem, a malaise among the
teachers and administrators, and children existed in an atmosphere
206. Id. at 284-85, 297.
207. AUSTIN SWANSON & RICHARD KING, SCHOOL FINANCE: ITS ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
340-41 (1991).
208. Tom Chenoweth, Unanticipated Consequences of Schools of Choice: Some Thoughts on
the Case of San Francisco, 7 EQUITY AND CHOICE 35, 35 (1989).
209. Good examples of this are the Ohio proposals. House Bills 635, 825, and 851 create
vouchers in the amount of the per-pupil cost in the district of residence. See 1992 Ohio H.B. 635,
119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1992); 1992 Ohio H.B. 825, 119th Ohio Gen.
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (July 15, 1992); 1992 Ohio H.B. 851, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg.
Sess. (Aug. 28, 1992). The OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN creates vouchers up to $3,000. OHIO
SCHOLARSHIP PLAN. supra note 4, at 4. Neither would be adequate to cover the costs of most
private schools in the state. There is the potential, therefore, for Equal Protection challenges to
both the proposals and the plan on the basis of discriminatory socioeconomic impact.
210. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 44.
211. Kirp, supra note 55, at 120.
212. Id.
213. Walter B. Wriston, The State of American Management, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1990, at 83.
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void of learning. 14 This changed radically with the influx of gener-
ous amounts of state and federal money and new administrative
leadership. The change, however, may not have helped those stu-
dents most in need; instead, it put them in a position of competing
for the good schools in East Harlem under the rubric of choice.
Choice, therefore, became a gate-keeper for school administrators,
not parents. 1 School officials used choice to select and admit the
most academically gifted of the students. In fact, until recently,
these schools had hidden admissions criteria enabling them to
choose students long before parents had a chance to apply.2"' This
was school choice in Harlem, and using the same criteria as other
selective institutions, good students were already in the better
schools." 7
Activities of school personnel notwithstanding, there is some re-
search that suggests a difference in the way parents of varied socio-
economic backgrounds make decisions relative to choice. 1 One
study of a choice program in Alum Rock, California, involved tui-
tion vouchers given to parents over a five-year period between 1972
and 1977. The study found that information levels regarding the
voucher program were much higher among white parents with
higher incomes, and the parents' educational backgrounds proved to
be an especially important factor. 1 9 To wit, these parents were
much more likely to use the vouchers and to choose schools that
offered the best possible education.2 0
The Alum Rock study highlights the role of information acquisi-
tion in educational choice, as well as education and experience in
choosing among alternatives. Henry Levin also concludes that in ail
these respects, low-income minority parents are simply ill-equipped
to make the informed decisions that other parents can.221 Part of the
reason is the lack of access to information, and even if information
is readily available, the fact remains that these parents suffer the
inability to decipher the argot of legislative and administrative
214. Kirp, supra note 55, at 120.
215. Id. at 127.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Wells, supra note 21, at 142.
219. Id. at 147-50.
220. Id.
221. Levin, Theory of Choice, supra note 57, at 269.
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jargon.2"2 Levin notes that in a different California choice experi-
ment, even with a substantial effort to inform parents through vari-
ous media, there was considerably less awareness of choice options
among low-income minority parents.223 A similar pattern was found
in the choice program in Milwaukee, where many low-income mi-
nority parents had little idea of the names or descriptions of availa-
ble schools.224
Levin raises a further related difficulty concerning choice among
low-income minority parents. Choices are made on the basis of the
context of one's own experience, and studies have shown that blue-
collar parents tend to emphasize obedience to authority in the
choice of schools while white-collar families tend to emphasize criti-
cal and independent thinking.225 Extending these findings, this
would mean that low-income parents would tend to emphasize
highly structured schools stressing discipline and basic skills as op-
posed to middle and upper class parents, who would push the devel-
opment of greater freedom in the curriculum based on good commu-
nication skills and conceptual learning. 226  The latter type of
emphasis coincides with the college preparatory strand of schools.
Such an inbred problem, therefore, would likely perpetuate rather
than ameliorate class status under choice.227
The Carnegie study confirmed this problem, indicating that
choice programs work better for the better-educated. 228 Those with
the sophistication, the knowledge, and the income were better able
to choose the best academic programs in Minnesota and Milwau-
kee.22 19 Low-income students, including those who may be homeless,
in the care of under-educated grandparents, in group homes, or have
drug problems stand little chance if the choice is left to any but very
knowledgeable, culturally sensitive, and committed school personnel.
222. In the East Harlem choice program, some poor families were disadvantaged by the com-
plicated and stilted admissions processes, and this had the effect of turning some families away
from the program. See Donald R. Moore & Suzanne Davenport, High School Choice and Stu-
dents at Risk, 5 EQUITY AND CHOICE 5, 7 (1989) [hereinafter Moore & Davenport, High School
Choice] (noting that students in New York City were confronted with a catalog over 300 pages
long, listing 261 different schools and programs to which they, in theory, could apply).
223. Levin, Theory of Choice, supra note 57, at 269.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 270.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 16.
229. Id.
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Furthermore, unless regulation of choice programs addresses the
needs of the least economically able, such persons will have no real
choice.
D. Parental Rights
In the choice debate, one of the major points of contention relates
to parental rights in influencing a child's education. In fact, this ar-
gument has served as one of the foundations for choice programs
from the beginning. Choice advocates claim that parents should
have the right to choose not only the type of school, but the type of
education they want for their children. The most strident proponents
of increased family control are usually fundamentalist/evangelical
sects and other religious groups. °30 These groups advocate including
private schools in the educational choice programs. They promote
the idea that parents should have a greater role in selecting the edu-
cational programs that serve to shape the values of their children. 3'
The notion is that just as parents themselves influence the values
and traditions of their children, they should be able to select schools
that reinforce these mores. A choice of schools, therefore, is neces-
sary to exercise such a right.
Proponents of this idea include Ruth Randall, former Commis-
sioner of Public Education in Minnesota, who stated that "choice is
for everyone.'"232 She also stated that although Americans have
many choices with regard to most of the fundamentals of-life, "The
one place . ..where [they] have not been able to choose is educa-
tion for children from the time they start kindergarten through
grade 12 unless . . .[they] have money to pay for private school or
for tuition to a different public school. 233
The Carnegie report notes that the United States Office of Educa-
tion under the Bush administration espoused this idea of a "funda-
mental right" of choice, claiming that assignment to a school based
on residence was undemocratic and that choice as a program would
improve schools for all strata of society a.23 The official position of
230. James S. Coleman, Schools and the Communities They Serve, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
527, 532 (1985).
231. Id.
232. RUTH E. RANDALL & KEITH GEIGER, SCHOOL CHOICE: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 9 (1991).
233. Id.
234. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 6. The concept of a fundamental right of parents to
participate in the decision-making process with respect to the education of their children has its
origin in two early Supreme Court cases. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
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the federal government, therefore, followed that of the choice propo-
nents, maintaining that the. state had gradually and unjustifiably
supplanted parents in shaping the education, beliefs, and values of
children.235
Contrary to the above positions, the right of parents to influence
or effect changes in the education their children receive has never
been held to be absolute.236 States have assumed the responsibility
for the education of children by enacting, for example, compulsory
attendance laws. Children, however, are not required to attend a
public school.23 7
Federal 3 ' and state 239 courts have consistently upheld the right of
(holding unconstitutional a statute that required children to attend public schools and stating that
parents have the liberty to direct the upbringing and education of their children); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to
young children and holding that the 14th Amendment's incorporation of the term "liberty" in-
cludes non-academic rights such as the right to teach and the right to acquire knowledge). In
Pierce, the Court stated that a state may not "standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. Hence, if they choose, parents can
send their children to private schools, whether they be religious or secular. Language in Justice
William Douglas's concurrence in Roe v. Wade also supports the view that parents may partici-
pate in the decisions regarding their childrens' education:
[American citizens are entitled to] freedom of choice in the basic decisions of...
life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception and the education and
upbringing of children.
These rights, unlike those protected by the First Amendment, are subject to some
control by the police power. . . . These rights are "fundamental" and we have held
that in order to support legislative action the statute must be narrowly and precisely
drawn and that a "compelling state interest" must be shown in support of the
limitation.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Never-
theless, the Court has held that education per se is not a fundamental right under the Constitu-
tion. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973). In that
case, the plaintiffs claimed that Texas's method of financing education violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The Supreme Court responded by declaring that education was not a right to be
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
235. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 6 (stating the position of the Bush administra-
tion with regard to school choice).
236. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that the primary role of parents in the upbringing of their children is now established be-
yond debate as an enduring American tradition. Yoder concerned the question of whether parents
have the right to determine the patterns of their childrens' education. The evidence showed that
Amish children, educated on Amish farms and in Amish shops under the supervision of adults,
made adequate gains in basic skills and citizenship. Id. at 212-13. If the evidence had been to the
contrary, the Court would probably have required that the Amish children attend either a public
school or an equivalent facility. Consequently, the state's power to determine what education
should be circumscribed the rights of the parents. Id. at 229-36.
237. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
238. Id. at 534. In this case, the Court stated:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
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the state to regulate education within its borders. In People v. Tur-
ner,2 40 the court rejected a claim that a California statute, which
required parents to place their children in either a public school o.r a
private school meeting certain prescribed conditions, deprived par-
ents of their constitutional right to determine how their children
should be educated. z4' Similarly, the Supreme Court of Maine up-
held the state's compulsory attendance laws and the right of the
state to control and regulate education, declaring that "where the
state has provided a reasonable procedure whereby [parents] may
vindicate their asserted right to educate their children[,] . . . they
may not ignore the procedure and then appeal to this court claiming
that their right has been denied. 242 Also, a New York court upheld
the legal authority of the state to impose reasonable educational
guidelines requiring parents to educate their children.243 The court
noted that parents have no absolute right to educate their children
free from state regulation and that they must observe the reasonable
requirements imposed by the state.244
The above short legal review exemplifies the rights of parents and
the state to make decisions regarding the education of children. Pro-
ponents of choice would take this issue further, asking that parents
receive special benefits for choosing to place their children in either
private or secular schools. Clearly, private and secular schools are
an important option for many citizens. Attendance at these institu-
tions is a choice made for various reasons, including religious ones.
As a matter of public policy, though, the state's taxpayers should
have no obligation to pay for this decision. The state's job is to regu-
late the nonpublic schools, not to ensure their survival.
In its report, the Governor's Commission on Educational Choice
for the State of Ohio stated that "the choice issue is grounded on
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils, to require
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good
moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good
citizenship must be taught and that nothing be taught, which is manifestly inimical to
the public welfare.
Id.
239. See infra notes 240-44 (discussing several cases that upheld state laws regulating
education).
240. 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. App. 1953).
241. Id. at 687.
242. Maine v. McDonough, 468 A.2d 977, 980 (1983).
243. Matter of Kilroy, 467 N.Y.S.2d 318, 321 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983).
244. Id.
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the basic premise that the child's parents or guardians are best
suited to choose the school which will develop the highest potential
of the individual child." 24 Furthermore, the report states, "We will
leave it to others to debate the merits or disadvantages of choice."246
This section of the article has delineated some of that debate.
IV. LEGAL ISSUES
Much has been written in journals and the media about the topic
of choice. 47 It is imperative that in addition to assessing the educa-
tional merits of these programs, educators, attorneys, and legislators
consider the legal ramifications of such legislation. This section will
provide an overview of legal challenges, examine the potential legal
implications of choice options, and point out areas where legislators
have exposed themselves to legal vulnerability. At this point in time
there is minimal case law on point. As a result, much of what is
contained herein is based on analogy to other areas of constitutional
and educational law.
A. Desegregation
Historically, legal challenges to choice plans have focused on
school desegregation efforts. 248 But given-recent desegregation cases,
there is some question as to whether open enrollment plans will be
245. OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Amy Christine Hevly, Note, Nothing Simple or Certain: Establishment Clause
Barriers to Choice Systems in American Education, 35 ARIz. L REV. 467 (1993) (analyzing the
constitutional ramifications of open enrollment plans); Jim Hilton, Note, Local Autonomy, Educa-
tional Equity, and Choice: A Criticism of a Proposal to Reform America's Educational System,
72 B.U. L. REV. 973 (1992) (examining the difficulties inherent in funding school choice programs
through traditional school finance mechanisms); Parker, supra note 158 (arguing that the monop-
oly of public schools over education has produced a steady decline in student achievement and
that a free market in education could arrest this trend); Carol L. Ziegler & Nancy M. Lederman,
School Vouchers: Are Urban Students Surrendering Rights for Choice?, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
813 (1992) (arguing that tuition vouchers will foster the racial and economic segregation of public
and private schools); Lovell Beaulieu, National Study Shows Most Parents Reject School Choice,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, October 26, 1992, at IA (discussing the results of the Carnegie Report);
Susan Chira, The Rules of the Marketplace Are Applied to the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
1991, at Al (examining the issues and unanswered questions involved in the school choice debate);
James P. Pinkerton, Offering Hope to Children in School: Vouchers Would Offer Less Bureau-
cracy and Better Education, L.A. TIMES, September 3, 1993, at B7 (supporting Proposition 174,
an item on the November, 1993 California ballot that would create a statewide voucher program).
248. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down school choice plan that had
the effect of creating severe segregation in a community's schools where segregation had not ex-
isted prior to enactment of the plan).
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found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause if they result in racial resegregation. However, school dis-
tricts currently operating under desegregation mandates are particu-
larly vulnerable to legal challenges because they have an affirmative
duty to eliminate the effects of prior racial discrimination. Open en-
rollment plans can be used to satisfy this affirmative duty whether
or not they actually result in desegregated schools.24
National school desegregation by court order began with Brown v.
Board of Education,250 which held that de jure segregation in public
education was unconstitutional. 51 The Supreme Court intended that
Brown's mandate eliminate single-race schools and lead to integra-
tion, but Brown can be read in more than one way. Did the Brown
Court demand racial balance in schools, or did it simply require rel-
ative equality of educational opportunity? Under the former read-
ing, mostly one-race schools are not permissible; under the latter,
they are.
This controversy has led to a search for student assignment plans
that incorporate parental choice, but prevent racial and economic
isolation.252 A federal court has not yet decided a case in which the
constitutionality of a controlled choice plan is at issue. In addition,
there has been little litigation in the lower courts concerning choice.
The following subsections evaluate -the development of Equal Pro-
tection analysis, as applied in school desegregation cases by the
United States Supreme Court since Brown, and apply that analysis
in the context of school choice plans.
1. Brown's Progeny
The Brown decision consisted of two opinions: the first ("Brown
n/)253 provided the legal underpinnings for desegregation, while the
second ("Brown IF')254 implemented the tenets of the first. In
Brown I, a unanimous Court held that school segregation denied
plaintiffs equal protection of the law as mandated by the Fourteenth
249. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam) (striking
down a lower court's mandate delaying the desegregation of Mississippi schools and holding that
the continued operation of racially segregated schools under the "all deliberate speed" standard
was no longer constitutionally permissible).
250. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
251. Id.
252. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.320(4) (West Supp. 1993).
253. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
254. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Amendment.255 The Court first noted that cases construing the
Fourteenth Amendment precluded all state-imposed discrimination
against African-Americans.256 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Earl Warren chronicled the erosion of Plessy v. Ferguson,257 then
rebutted its central tenets by citing modern psychological studies
that demonstrated the detrimental effect segregation had on black
schoolchildren.258 The Court stated, "To separate [African-Ameri-
can schoolchildren] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community . . . unlikely ever to be undone." '259
The Court then agreed to hear reargument on the issue of appropri-
ate relief.260
Unfortunately, Brown II failed to provide much direction to the
lower courts.26 ' Although the Court held that the school district in-
volved in the litigation had to proceed with "all deliberate speed" in
desegregating their schools, 26 2 the pace of desegregation remained
slow fifteen years after Brown I. Many judges, interpreting the
phrase "all deliberate speed," emphasized the efforts of blacks who
transferred into mostly white schools.263 A school district's compli-
ance with Brown often merely meant offering "freedom-of-choice"
plans which allowed courageous blacks to enter white schools. Few
whites entered the previously all-black schools.
In Green v. County School Board,26 4 the Court examined a "free-
255. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495 (addressing de jure school segregation). The Equal Protection
Clause reads: "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." US. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
256. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 490.
257. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana law that required "separate-but-equal" ac-
commodations for white and African-American railroad passengers). This case marked the evolu-
tion of the "separate-but-equal" analysis that governed the Supreme Court's analysis of racially-
based Equal Protection challenges until Brown.
258. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 491-94.
259. Id. at 494.
260. Id. at 495.
261. The decision placed the burden of eliminating desegregation on local school boards and
instructed lower courts to consider whether the school boards had acted in good faith in carrying
out the principles set forth in the Court's first opinion. Brown v. Board of Educ., 394 U.S. 294,
299 (1954). Furthermore, the lower courts were left to fashion remedies guided by principles of
equity. Id. at 300. However, they could also consider other factors that might delay implementa-
tion of those remedies. Id. at 300-01.
262. Id. at 301.
263. Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v.
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 7, 29-30 (1975).
264. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The county, located in eastern Virginia, had no residential segrega-
tion prior to enactment of the choice plan. Id. at 432. Nevertheless, the two-school system of 740
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dom-of-choice" plan. The Court found such plans unacceptable as a
sufficient step in the transition to a racially unitary school system.2"5
Even though earlier Supreme Court decisions focused on providing
black students the opportunity to attend all-white schools, the Court
held that these goals were only a first step. 66 New Kent County had
not acted with deliberate speed in desegregating its schools; it
adopted its freedom-of-choice plan eleven years after Brown ."67 In
its examination of the freedom-of-choice plans, the Court stated
that such plans are not automatically unconstitutional"' and that:
Where it offers real promise of aiding a desegregation program to effectuate
conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial system
there might be no objection to allowing such a device to prove itself in oper-
ation. On the other hand, if there are reasonably available other ways, such
for illustration [sic] as zoning, promising speedier and more effective conver-
sion to a unitary, nonracial school system, "freedom of choice" must be held
unacceptable.26
The Court further determined that school systems must satisfy
seven factors in order to comply with a desegregation order. Known
to later courts as the "Green factors," they require that: (1) students
of all races receive the same quality education; (2) administrator
and teacher assignments be race neutral; (3) student assignments be
race neutral; (4) all students be given equal access to the school
transportation system; (5) all schools receive equitable allocations of
resources; (6) school buildings and facilities be of equal quality; and
(7) all students be given equal access to extracurricular activities. 70
The Court also concluded that the school district had not satisfied
these factors except where, as with school facilities, there was an
attempt to keep black and white children segregated. The Court
then required New Kent County to formulate a new plan for deseg-
regation which would result in the elimination of racially identifi-
able schools. 7'
Until 1971, Supreme Court desegregation decisions failed to de-
blacks and 550 whites remained segregated. After the plan went into effect, not one white child
elected to attend the formerly all-black school, and 85 percent of the black students remained at
the formerly all-black school. Id. at 441.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 436.
267. Id. at 438.
268. Id. at 439.
269. Id. at 440-41.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 442.
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lineate which equitable remedies lower courts could use in issuing
desegregation orders. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,272 the Court filled that void. In affirming a district
court's adoption of a desegregation plan drafted by a court-ap-
pointed expert, the Court broke down the central issue of school as-
signment into four questions.2 7 3 Two of the issues are relevant to the
school choice inquiry: whether a court may consider racial quotas in
issuing orders, and whether one-race schools must be eliminated
under a desegregation plan.274
The Court's objective in dealing with desegregation issues was to
ensure that school districts did not exclude pupils from any school,
directly or indirectly, on account of race. 5 In its opinion, the Court
noted that the district judge had found that variation from its racial
balance requirement of 71 percent white students to 29 percent
black students might be unavoidable, suggesting that the norm was
a fixed mathematical proportion. 276 But the Court found that the
lower court had used the ratios as no more than a starting point in
the process of shaping a remedy. The limited use of mathematical
ratios was, hence, within the equitable remedial discretion of the
courts.277
On the issue of one-race schools, the Court noted that African-
Americans often live in centralized groups in cities.278 Under some
circumstances, certain schools consisted of students of only one race
until the district provided new schools or neighborhood patterns
changed. The Court held that the existence of such schools under
these circumstances was not in and of itself discriminatory. 279
Milliken v. Bradley,2 80 howeve', placed limitations on the reach
of the remedial powers explicitly available to lower courts after
272. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
273. Id. at 22.
274. Id. In answering the other questions, the Supreme Court clarified that lower courts may
engage in remedial altering of school zones and that transportation of students is permissible
under a desegregation plan. Id. at 27-29.
275. Id. at 23.
276. Id. at 23-24.
277. Id. at 25.
278. Id. at 25-26.
279. Id. The Court placed the burden of proving those circumstances on the school board,
presuming that such schools did not meet the mandate of Brown. The Court required that a school
board provide for the optional transfer of students attending one-race schools to other schools
where they would be in the minority, and that the board assure free transportation and available
space at other schools in the district. Id. at 26-27.
280. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Swann. The Michigan law at issue in Milliken required suburban
school districts surrounding the City of Detroit to participate in a
massive integration plan with the city, even though the City of De-
troit, its suburbs, or the State of Michigan had never had a statu-
tory or constitutional provision which legislated segregation in
schools.2 8' The district court upheld the legislation, finding that the
only feasible desegregation plan for the city of Detroit involved the
crossing of boundary lines for the limited purpose of desegrega-
tion. 82 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that absent a showing
of a constitutional violation within a suburban district that produced
a segregative effect in another district, such a plan was impermissi-
ble.28 The Milliken Court stressed the importance of local control
in education, a notion which it had articulated two years earlier in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.284 The leg-
islation at issue in Milliken was found by the Court to abolish local
control.288 The Court remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs the
opportunity to demonstrate constitutional violations within the sub-
urban districts that produced a segregative effect in the City of
Detroit. 86
A 1990 decision, Missouri v. Jenkins,2"7 reaffirmed the vast reach
of federal courts when formulating desegregation orders. In Jenkins,
the Western District Court of Missouri issued a writ of mandamus
requiring the imposition of increased property taxes for the Kansas
City, Missouri, School District ("KCMSD"). 88 The monies were to
fund an elaborate "magnet school" program designed to attract stu-
dents of all races to the Kansas City schools. Missouri law, however,
prevented the school district from raising property taxes without the
281. Id. at 722-23.
282. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
283. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-45. The Milliken Court was split, with Justices William Bren-
nan, Byron White, William Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall dissenting, and Justice Potter Stew-
art writing a concurring opinion limiting the decision to the particular facts at issue in the case.
284. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs attacked the State of Texas's method of
financing education as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court, however, held that education was not a fundamental right under the Constitution and thus
was not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)
(stating that although education is not a fundamental right, "neither is it merely some governmen-
tal 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.").
285. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-43.
286. Id. at 753.
287. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
288. Id. at 38-39.
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consent of voters, who had refused to do so.2"9 The State of Missouri
challenged the writ on grounds that the district court lacked the
power to impose the tax increase. 290 Although the Supreme Court
found the imposition of a tax increase to be an abuse of discretion, it
upheld the court of appeals' modification authorizing KCMSD to
submit a levy to the state revenue department sufficient to fund the
court's required budget and to enjoin the operation of state laws
limiting or reducing the levy below that limit.291 In other words, the
court could order a tax increase to fund a high-priced desegregation
plan, although the executive and legislative branches would actually
have to impose the tax.
The most recent cases in this area heard by the Supreme Court
have involved districts attempting to extricate themselves.from fed-
eral court supervision of desegregation efforts. In Board of Educa-
tion v. Dowell,29 2 the Court expressed its willingness to grant school
districts more discretion in administering desegregation plans where
the district at one time had achieved unitary status but had since
reverted to a system permitting segregated schools to exist.293 The
district court in Dowell imposed a desegregation plan on Oklahoma
City in 1972 after finding that previous efforts by the city's school
board were ineffective in eliminating the effects of de jure segrega-
tion.2 94 In 1977, the same court held that the school district had
achieved "unitary" status and lifted its order.295 In 1984, the school
district adopted a School Reassignment Plan ("SRP"), under which
a number of previously desegregated schools would again become
289. Id. The total cost of the desegregation remedy was estimated at $88 million for three
years. The Missouri Constitution, however, limited property taxes to $1.25 per $100 of assessed
value unless a majority of voters approved a greater levy, and to $3.25 per $100 unless two-thirds
of the voters approved the levy. Also, the district could not just raise assessed values, since the
state's Hancock Amendment required corresponding decreases in the property tax levy when as-
sessed values rose. Id.
To illustrate the expansiveness of the district judge's ruling, property taxes in Kansas City
doubled after the decision was handed down. Per-pupil spending in the KCMSD increased to
$6,783, compared to a statewide average of $3,786. Although not exhaustive, this list typifies the
benefits conferred as a result of the court's order: Olympic-sized swimming pools, a model ancient
Greek village, a 25-acre farm, and a scale model of the U.N. General Assembly. ArLynn Leiber
Presser, Broken Dreams, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 60, 63.
290. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 37.
291. Id. at 52.
292. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
293. Id. at 248-49.
294. Id. at 241-42.
295. Id.
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predominantly one-race schools.2 96 In 1985, the respondents in
Dowell moved to reopen the desegregation case, contending that the
district had not achieved unitary status and that the SRP marked a
return to segregation. 97
While the primary issue in Dowell concerned the conditions under
which an injunctive order could be lifted, an undercurrent of deseg-
regation policy was evident, especially in Justice Marshall's dissent-
ing opinion. 98 Notwithstanding this fact, the Dowell Court held
that federal supervision of local school systems was intended to be a
temporary measure to remedy past discrimination. 99 It repeated the
Milliken Court's emphasis on local control of education: if a school
district has complied with court conditions for a "reasonable" pe-
riod, dissolution of the decree recognizes the importance of local
control .3 0  According to the Court, if a school board has discrimi-
nated in the past, a district court need not accept the board's profes-
sions of future good faith at face value.301 At the same time, compli-
ance with previous orders must be considered relevant. The Court
remanded the case to the district court to allow it to determine
whether the Oklahoma City school board had made a sufficient
showing of constitutional compliance as of 1985, when the SRP was
adopted, to enable the court to dissolve the injunction. 2 The lower
court was directed to determine whether the board had complied
with the decree and whether the vestiges of past discrimination were
virtually eliminated. 3  Furthermore, it is clear that the school dis-
296. Id. at 242.
297. Id. The district court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded,
finding that the 1972 order had never been lifted. On remand, the district court again found that
demographic changes had rendered the 1972 plan unworkable and that the school district had
made a good-faith attempt to comply with the court's orders. The court held that residential
segregation in Oklahoma City was the result of private decision-making and economics and could
not be linked to previous school segregation. It concluded that the previous injunctive decree
should be vacated, returning the school district to local control. The court of appeals again re-
versed, holding that an injunction could be lifted only if it inflicted a "grievous wrong" on a party
resulting from unforeseen, drastic changes. Id. at 242-44.
298. Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that Oklahoma City had re-
sisted litigation for eleven years before the .1972 order. He feared that the majority's standard for
dissolving a desegregation order was too mild. Justice Marshall's test for deciding whether the
desegregation order should be dissolved was to determine whether any vestiges of discrimination
still existed. Id. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 248.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 249.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 249-50.
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trict remained subject to the mandate of the Equal Protection
Clause. °4
Finally, the Supreme Court held in Freeman v. Pitts305 that
resegregation does not have constitutional implications if the
resegregation results from private choices rather than state ac-
tion. 06 In Freeman, the DeKalb County (Georgia) School System
sought to be released from federal court supervision of its efforts to
eliminate the effects of past de jure segregation. The school system
claimed that residential factors caused resegregation in the school
district. Concomitantly, it claimed that it set a plan in motion which
satisfied most of the factors necessary for achieving desegregation
and attempted to extricate itself from court jurisdiction.0 7 The dis-
trict court agreed with one part of the school board's argument in
that unitariness was found in the Green factors of transportation,
school assignments, extracurricular activities, and physical facilities
between those schools containing predominantly one-race schools.30 8
Nonetheless, the court found vestiges of a dual system in quality of
education and in teacher and administrative assignments. 30 9 The
case was brought up on appeal where the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that court jurisdiction would continue until all of the Green factors
were met. 10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and later held that federal
courts may relinquish supervision of suspect schools even when only
some of the Green factors have been accomplished; specifically,
courts can order that school districts are free of judicial control
when they can demonstrate desegregation in "incremental
stages. ' '31 1 The Court seemed to further its position of moving away
from the dictates of Brown and Green by stating that:
[Ulpon a finding that a school system subject to a court-supervised desegre-
gation plan is in compliance in some but not all areas, the court in appropri-
ate cases may return control to the school system in those areas where com-
pliance has been achieved, limiting further judicial supervision to operations
304. The 14th Amendment provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
305. 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992).
306. Id. at 1448.
307. Id. at 1433.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1441-42.
310. Id. at 1442.
311. Id. at 1445.
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that are not yet in full compliance with the court decree. 1'
2. School Choice Under Equal Protection Analysis
Controlled parental choice is distinct from the freedom of choice
plans of the 1960s, which the Court held unconstitutional, because
controlled choice uses quotas to ensure racial balance in schools.
Thus, a court would not strike down a controlled choice plan on the
same grounds used to invalidate freedom of choice plans.
Green v. County School Board313  suggests that the Supreme
Court will use a comparative approach to determine whether school
choice plans in previously segregated districts survive scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. If a choice plan "offers real promise
. . . to effectuate conversion . . . to a unitary, non-racial system," it
may be upheld under Green.314 At the same time, the Green Court
emphasized that if other available means of achieving a unitary,
non-racial school system will result in effectuating conversion more
quickly than a choice plan, the alternate means should be chosen. a15
A controlled choice plan's use of racial quotas may, however, be
constitutionally problematic. a6 If a court finds past intentional dis-
crimination in a school system, the court will uphold the use of quo-
tas. In a system that has achieved unitary status, however, it is
questionable whether a court would rely on past discrimination to
justify such racial classification. Because a constitutional right to
racial balance in public schools does not exist, a controlled choice
312. Id. at 1445-46 (emphasis added).
313. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
314. Id. at 440-41.
315. See Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 757 F. Supp. 328, 351 (D. Del.
1991) (holding that voluntary techniques, such as magnet schools, have a place in desegregation
plans where they offer promise of aiding a school district in moving toward full compliance with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
316. See Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 633 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 861
F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1985) (demonstrating that choice in education is not per se unconstitutional).
In Diaz, the court distinguished controlled choice plans from freedom of choice plans that had
previously been held unconstitutional. In order to remedy segregative intent, the court fashioned a
plan similar to controlled choice to achieve desegregation. Id. at 812. Under the court's plan,
students could rank school preferences. The plan also featured district-wide magnet schools and
schools with specialty enrichment programs, designed to encourage students to attend schools
outside the neighborhood in an attempt to achieve voluntary desegregation. If voluntary choices
did not lead to sufficient desegregation, however, the plan allowed a school board to impose ethnic
caps to achieve the desired racial and ethnic balance. Id. at 815-16. The Ninth Circuit upheld the
freedom of choice plan at issue, stating that the plan "reflects Green's admonition that 'freedom of
choice is not an end in itself,' but that it may have a proper place in a desegregation plan." Diaz,
861 F.2d at 596 (citation omitted).
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plan's use of. racial quotas may lead to its downfall. If a controlled
choice plan accomplishes its stated purpose of providing students
with quality desegregated educational opportunities, students may
have no cause to challenge the plan.
In Swann, the Court explicitly disavowed the use of fixed mathe-
matical ratios in fashioning desegregation remedies, endorsing them
only as a starting point. 17 Such ratios are useless even as a starting
point, however, in the wake of Milliken.3 18 Parents with the means
to do so can avoid desegregation by either moving to a suburban
district or by sending their children to private schools.319
The Court's willingness to uphold the Kansas City tax increase in
Jenkins2 ° might implicitly suggest that the Court is moving toward
endorsing schemes that encourage integration rather than mandate
it.3 2 1 The Kansas City magnet schools were designed to make the
city's schools so attractive that white suburban pupils would want to
317. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that one-
race schools are not per se discriminatory); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406 (1977) (holding that a school desegregation plan that required each school in a district to be
brought within 15 percent of the black-white ratio of the city was unjustified); Harris v. Crenshaw
County Bd. of Educ., 968 F.2d 1090 (11 th Cir. 1992) (holding that when a school board proposes
to close a school facility with a predominantly minority student body, it must adduce evidence
sufficient to support the conclusion that its actions were not in fact motivated by racial reasons).
The court stated that until a school system achieves unitary status, it has an affirmative duty to
eliminate the effects of prior unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 1094-95. In order to fulfill that duty,
"school officials are obligated not only to avoid any official action that has the effect of perpetuat-
ing or reestablishing a dual school system, but also to render decisions that further desegregation
and help to eliminate the effects of the previous dual school system."). Id. at 1095.
318. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see also supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding in Milliken).
319. See Pasadena Bd. of Educ v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (holding that a school district
which had implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy perceived consti-
tutional violations on the part of schools officials need no longer be subject to court supervision).
In Spangler. the court had fully performed its function of providing an appropriate remedy for
previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns. The court determined that the subsequent
failure of a racially neutral student assignment system, resulting from changes in the
demographics of residential patterns caused by families moving in and out of the school district,
does not require annual readjustment of attendance zones. Id. at 436-37; see also Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (holding that disparate impact and foreseeable conse-
quences, without more, do not establish a constitutional violation, and that where it is foreseeable
that a demographic shift may result in resegregation following a declaration of unitary status, this
factor by itself will not result in a finding that the district is in violation of the previous desegrega-
tion mandate).
320. 495 U.S. 33 (1990); see also supra notes 287-91 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding in Jenkins).
321. See also Willan v. Menomonee Falls Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 1416 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (hold-
ing that Wisconsin's plan for school integration, authorizing the school district to enter into volun-
tary agreements providing for the interdistrict transfers of pupils in order to promote racial inte-
gration, was valid and constitutionally viable).
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attend them, effectively integrating the schools. 22 Similarly, even if
a court decides Brown requires racial integration of all public school
classrooms, school choice proponents might be able to demonstrate
that a school choice plan would result in ratios of white to minority
students closer to the state or area averages than would occur under
traditional, post-Milliken desegregation plans. 23
Dowel124 and Freeman,a25 however, might offer the most persua-
sive arguments that the Court, in the school choice context, will in-
terpret Brown as standing for equality of educational opportunity,
and not necessarily for racial integration. The Dowell Court indi-
cated a willingness to defer to local and state school authorities.326
The school board's Student Reassignment Plan involved a return to
some predominantly one-race schools, yet the Court refused to find
the plan to be a per se violation of Brown.32 7 Thus, if one conse-
quence of a school choice plan would be the re-creation of several
mostly one-race schools, the Court may likely find no per se viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.
Based on the above rendition of case law, it would appear that a
thumb has been placed on the scales of justice, weighted in favor of
school choice, even at the cost of resegregation. This interpretation
overlooks the sociological and psychological principles that the
Brown ruling was based on:
To separate [African-American schoolchildren] from others of similar age
and qualifications .. generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
322. See also Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 757 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del.
1991) (holding that voluntary techniques such as magnet schools have a place in desegregation
plans where they offer the promise of helping a school district comply with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
323. Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1991). This case involved a new
student assignment plan that was implemented after a finding of unitary status. The court held
that in "unitary" school systems only intentional discrimination on the part of school officials
violates the Constitution. Id. at 1315. Evidence of a possible segregative impact of the new student
assignment plan was not determinative of unconstitutionality absent a showing that the school
board acted with discriminatory intent. Id. at 1318. Foreseeability of the discriminatory impact of
a school district's student assignment plan, without more, is not proof of forbidden discriminatory
purposes. Id. at 1319.
324. 498 U.S. 237 (1991); see also supra notes 292-304 and accompanying text (discussing the
decision in Dowell and its effect on the Court's analysis of school plans aimed at ending
segregation).
325. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); see also supra notes 305-12 and accompanying text (detailing the
Freeman holding and its impact on the Court's analysis of school plans).
326. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248.
327. Id. at 242-43, 249.
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ever to be undone .... "Segregation of white and [African-American] chil-
dren in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the [African-American]
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferi-
ority of the [African American] group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, there-
fore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
[African-American] children and to deprive them of some of the benefits
they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."" 8
This reasoning from Brown I was reiterated in Freeman with the
Court's position that school districts must eliminate a segregated
system, because leaving it intact would ensure that racial stigma
would remain.3 29 The Court in Freeman went on to emphasize that
the Green factors and the precepts of Brown work in tandem, and
that if racial identifiability of schools is a result of the assessment,
courts must fashion remedies to correct the relevant components of
the school system.330
Ergo, opponents of school choice could argue that such a program
stigmatizes some minority students by branding the public schools
they attend as inferior. This is similar to the demoralization and
stigma that the Supreme Court observed in Brown and recounted in
Freeman. The dual system created before 1954 branded minority
students as different and of lesser intellect than white students.
Some of the evidence from school choice programs denotes a similar
stigmatizing effect on minority children - such programs delegate
them to inferior schools lacking the infrastructural support given to
other schools, sometimes even those in the same district.
A study of magnet programs in four large cities found that mag-
net schools designed to attract large numbers of white students re-
ceive much larger allocations of school district and state dollars than
other schools in the district.331 In addition, school personnel evalu-
ated as the best were systematically assigned to those schools.
Equipment and supplies, hard to obtain in the regular institutions,
were readily available in the magnet schools. The study found that
the presence of this kind of "choice" produced a constant feeling of
inferiority and disconcertion among students, staff, and parents in
328. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953) (citation omitted) (alterations in
original).
329. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992).
330. Id. at 1445 (holding that federal courts have authority to relinquish supervision and con-
trol of school districts in incremental stages).
331. Moore & Davenport, High School Choice, supra note 222, at 9.
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the non-magnet schools."' 2 Choice sent a message in these cities that
it was the exclusive province of an established elite, precisely the
message that the Brown and Freeman Courts found
unconstitutional.
Choice proponents point to the fact that all existing legislation in
this area carries a caveat against discrimination, and that a market
approach will in fact encourage desegregation. Their contention is
that anti-discrimination laws will guarantee equal opportunity for
all students. This may be faulty reasoning because, as noted before,
competition for "choice" spaces is by no means based on an even
playing field, and civil rights laws do not encompass all kinds of
discrimination with which school officials should be concerned.
Moreover, even when certain practices are prohibited by law, the
existence of those laws will not necessarily prevent discrimination.
For example, the proposed voucher plan in Pennsylvania included a
nondiscrimination provision;333 however, testimony from members of
religious schools indicated that certain kinds of-students would have
a difficult time gaining admission because they were not affiliated
with a particular church. 34 The Ohio Scholarship Plan addresses
this issue as well, as it has a nondiscrimination provision based on
race. 3 However, a major part of the document indicates that first
priority for admission to religiously affiliated schools goes to mem-
bers of the sponsoring church .33 6 This means that despite the exis-
tence of protective laws, choice may remain elusive for some stu-
dents unless a complaint is brought.
Such a complaint involving private schools in the choice confines
may occur for a variety of reasons. One part of the Ohio Scholar-
ship Plan, for example, contains no language referring to race, gen-
der, or creed. In another part of the document, racial discrimination
is expressly forbidden.337 Notwithstanding this apparent conflict,
private schools are not protected under the constitution if they ex-
hibit racial prejudice. In Runyon v. McCrary,338 the Supreme Court
332. Id.
333. PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1991 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, at 1918 (Dec.
1I, 1991) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL].
334. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 171, at 16.
335. OHIo SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4.
336. Id. at 6-7.
337. Id. at 6.
338. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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ruled that federal law33 9 protects a citizen's right to enter into con-
tracts and that it prohibits private, nonsectarian schools from deny-
ing admission solely on the basis of race.3"'
This study already spoke to the fact that the proposed Ohio
choice plan involves private religious schools. Such schools may lose
their tax exempt status if they engage in racial discrimination. This
was determined in Bob Jones University v. United States,"4 1 where
the facts demonstrated that African-Americans were only admitted
under a very restrictive policy.342 The Supreme Court found such
actions to be inconsistent with the public interest.3 43
The above analysis featuring civil rights laws and accompanying
case law only serves to provide the reader with some understanding
of the problems that may be engendered by choice legislation. The
legality of the issues should certainly influence, but should not drive,
the concerns of either promoters or detractors of school choice. In-
stead, the focus should be on the choice models themselves which, in
their current state, separate students in ways that may or may not
be legally prohibited but which, regardless, ought to be troubling to
educators and attorneys alike.
B. Students With Disabilities
School choice relates not only to able-bodied students, but to ones
with disabilities as well. A number of legal issues arise in this area
that legislators and school personnel must be cognizant of, since
there is the potential for dispute based on both federal and state
law. What follows is an explanation of the national disability stat-
utes, executive interpretations of those statutes relating to school
choice, and a rendering of state law as regards school choice and
disability. The analysis is limited to public schools; a statement
about private schools and disabled populations is made in the next
section on the Establishment Clause. Once again, Ohio legislation
will be featured in this section.
The educational rights of students with disabilities are created
and protected by three federal statutes. They include the Individuals
339. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1993).
340. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179.
341. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the government's interest in preventing racial discrimi-
nation is compelling enough to override a school's Free Exercise contention that its racially dis-
criminatory admissions policy was compelled by tenets of the religion with which it is affiliated).
342. Id. at 575.
343. Id.
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with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"),344 Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504"),345 and Title II of The
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 346 All three of these
statutes must be considered by those involved with students with
disabilities and "choice" because they serve as the legal structures
for determining the most appropriate education for children with
disabilities.
The fundamental premise of the IDEA is that all children with
disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education
("FAPE").347 A FAPE encompasses special education and related
services provided in the least restrictive environment. The provisions
of the IDEA set out extensive procedural requirements which center
around the development by the school or school system of an indi-
vidualized education program ("IEP") for each child with a disabil-
ity.348 The IEP must state the child's present level of educational
functioning and contain both long- and short-term educational goals
and objectives.349
Section 504 covers all programs receiving federal assistance and,
unlike the IDEA, is not limited to discrimination in educational in-
stitutions. However, United States Department of Education regula-
tions implementing Section 504 contain procedural and substantive
obligations which are binding on education agencies.3"'
The ADA is a very broad statute as well, covering not only the
issue of education, but also the issues of employment and transpor-
tation.351 Like the other statutes, the ADA mandates that schools
must provide and administer programs for disabled populations in
an appropriate and integrated environment. 52
344. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1993).
345. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1993).
346. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-134 (West Supp. 1993).
347. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1993).
348. 20 U.S.C.A § 1412(5)(C) (West Supp. 1993).
349. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(5) (1993).
350. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1993).
351. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-117, 12161-165, 12181-189 (West Supp. 1993).
352. The Code of Federal Regulations provides that a government agency "shall administer
programs and activities n the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified handi-
capped persons." 28 C.F.R. § 39.130(d) (1992). Section 794 of The Rehabilitation Act authorizes
the head of each government agency to "promulgate such regulations as may be necessary" to
carry out the purpose of the Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1993). Section 12133 of the
ADA then states, "The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29
[Rehabilitation Act of 1973] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter pro-
vides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132
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Executive interpretations of the scope of these statutes correlative
to the concept of choice may run counter to the interests of most
students with disabilities. As noted in Part II of this study, many
state statutes feature various forms of intradistrict and interdistrict
choice.353 This gives parents the opportunity to send their child to a
school either within or outside the school district. Once again, how-
ever, there appears to be the possibility of discriminatory activity as
parents of children with disabilities may not have this option. In an
executive opinion, the Director of the Office of Special Education
Programs ("OSEP") reiterated the policy that all education place-
ment decisions for special education students must be made by an
IEP team. 35" This means that the parents of such children must
meet with school personnel and make out a year-long written plan
before any transfer to another school can take place. This ruling, in
a sense, takes the education decision away from parents and places
it in the hands of others. In another part of this report, this author
argues that if choice is to remain an option, having school personnel
make some of these decisions may be useful for low-income children
whose parents are alienated by school bureaucracy or who simply do
not have the requisite knowledge to make informed choices. This
executive ruling may discriminate against children with disabilities
and their parents on the basis of one quality alone - whether or not
such parents are knowledgeable about available educational choices.
Sensitive to the impact of its ruling, OSEP issued another state-
ment in support of choice for the disabled population. According to
another executive opinion, "Federal law does not prohibit states
from requiring that responsibility for providing a free appropriate
public education .. . to children with handicaps be transferred
from the school district of the child's residence (resident district) to
the non-resident school district of parental choice (choice district)
"355
of this title." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12133 (West Supp. 1993). Thus, through the previously mentioned
regulatory authority, the ADA requires all state schools to provide appropriate facilities for stu-
dents with disabilities.
353. See supra notes 55-157 and accompanying text (discussing both intradistrict and interdis-
trict plans and comparing plans currently in effect in Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin); see also
infra Appendix A (surveying the choice legislation currently available in or under consideration
by each state).
354. 17 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. 834 (OSEP 1991).
355. Joseph R. McKinney, Special Education and Parental Choice: An Oxymoron in the Mak-
ing, 76 W. EDUC. L. REP. 667, 669 (1992) [hereinafter McKinney, Parental Choice] (quoting 16
EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. 554, 555 (OSEP 1990)) (alterations in original).
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If a student with disabilities was permitted to invoke choice and
subsequently transfer, the nonresident school district would become
responsible under the aforementioned federal statutes for his or her
education. This would include making decisions about placement
and bearing the cost of any essential services or equipment needed
to assist in learning activities. Needless to say, educating a disabled
student can sometimes be quite expensive, and states may be moti-
vated to give narrow interpretations to the executive rulings stated
herein so as to circumvent choice privileges. The rulings essentially
say that such a decision is the prerogative of the state. This broad
mandate, however, leads to the determination that a right to a
FAPE in the least restrictive environment depends on the state of
domicile. For example, Utah and Idaho permit parents of children
with disabilities to "not only . . select school districts outside of
their residential district but . . . actually choose a particular educa-
tional program or school within the choice district."3 56 On the other
hand, six states - Utah, Colorado, Washington, Iowa, Nebraska,
and Ohio - have promulgated statutes establishing limitations on
choice transfers due to disabilities and permit receiving boards of
education to require such students to "attend school where the ser-
vices described in the student's IEP are available. '357 This raises a
legal problem in that Section 504 prohibits the denial of benefits of
services offered to "qualified" disabled persons by a school dis-
trict.3 8 Moreover, there are numerous elements of the IDEA that
prohibit discrimination against students with disabilities that could
be applied to choice legislation.3 59
Ohio's statutes dealing with choice, as noted, permit school dis-
tricts to place limitations on the admission of students with disabili-
ties.360 These limitations are dictated by the mandated creation of
an IEP team which must give its imprimatur for a change of place-
ment. The receiving district also has veto power if it does not have
the services needed to accommodate the student's disability.361
356. Id. at 670.
357. OIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.97(C)(2), 3313.98(C)(2) (Anderson 1990). See also
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-36-101(3)(b) (West Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 282.18(9)
(West Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-3407 (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-2-207(I)
(Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.190.020 - .030 (West Supp. 1993).
358. Mckinney, Parental Choice, supra note 355, at 671.
359. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1993).
360. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.98(c)(2) (Anderson 1990).
361. Id.
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These are not admission criteria that parents of able-bodied students
face; clearly, the choices for parents of children with disabilities are
much more limited. Still, legislative sections and case law may be
used to challenge this differential.
The platform for such a challenge begins with Section 504, which
prohibits the denial of benefits to qualified students with disabili-
ties.3"2 However, we proceed with the determination that choice is a
benefit available to all students, including those "qualified" ones
with disabilities. This means that all school districts are obligated
first to make a determination as to whether a child can be educated
with requisite aids and services before making a decision not to edu-
cate or not to admit, if read in concert with Section 504.363 The
"choice" statutes of Ohio and five other states36 4 would permit
school district decisions without such a determination.
In fact, school districts cannot institute eligibility criteria for stu-
dents with disabilities (once again, read in concert with Section 504)
with regard to a responsibility for education. In Timothy W. v.
Rochester School District,36 5 for example, the issue was whether
school districts have an obligation toward students despite the sever-
ity of their disability. The First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
the IDEA contains no requirement that a child with a disability first
demonstrate that he or she could benefit from an education in order
to be eligible to attend school.3 "6 The ruling firmly established the
IDEA's "no reject provision" by emphatically stating that school
districts cannot impose eligibility requirements for disabled children
seeking an education. 6 7 Under both Section 504 and the IDEA, if
choice is a benefit available to all students in a state, children with
disabilities cannot be refused admission because of their disability
alone.
The claims of parents of children with disabilities desiring place-
ment in a nonresidential school district might also be buttressed by
362. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1993).
363. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1993); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b) (1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 3301-51-01 (1990).
364. McKinney, Parental Choice, supra note 355, at 370-71. The other five states are Colo-
rado, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and Washington. Id. See supra note 357 and accompanying text
(listing the choice statutes of the states that permit school district decisions without such a
determination).
365. 875 F.2d 954 (Ist Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989).
366. Id. at 962.
367. Id. at 960.
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the decision in Roncker v. Walter,318 a "least restrictive environ-
ment" case decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Roncker
held that the Education for All Handicapped Children Act required
mainstreaming to be provided to the maximum extent appropri-
ate.369 The court here was concerned with whether a student would
be better suited for a private or public facility. 370 The parents de-
sired the public school so that their son would be associated with
other nondisabled children. 371 The court held that the proper deter-
mination for the Sixth Circuit was whether services offered by a
separate facility for children with disabilities could be offered by a
regular school.37 2 The court said that school systems could consider
concerns such as educational benefit to the student, whether the
child would be a "disruptive force" in the classroom, and the cost of
educating the child. 37 1 If choice is an-educational benefit under Sec-
tion 504, to be made available to all students, and if school districts
must consider the above criteria before refusing a student, the stat-
utes of Ohio and other states unlawfully discriminate against some
students with disabilities.
Choice has both its proponents and detractors. Proponents postu-
late that it creates greater options which in turn foster achievement
and the integration of students. Unless and until attention is paid to
admissions criteria for students with disabilities in the choice legis-
lation of states like Ohio, neither achievement nor integration will
be assured. This represents an argument in favor of the detractors.
C. Private School Choice Plans: State Aid to Sectarian Schools
As discussed, several states currently have or will soon enact
school choice programs. In analyzing these programs, one issue that
must be broached is the possibility that educational choice will
lower the wall between church and state when sectarian schools take
the state's educational dollar. Choice plans stipulating the distribu-
tion of public funds to private schools have been challenged as in-
fringing upon the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental action that ad-
368. 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
369. Id. at 1063.
370. Id. at 1061.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1063.
373. Id.
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vances or impedes religion or excessively entangles church and
state.374 The reader will note that the issue of private schools has
been broadened to include religiously affiliated schools. This is nec-
essary because only one case, Davis v. Grover,3 75 has arisen relating
to choice and private nonsectarian schools. It is therefore difficult to
discuss choice and private schools without including sectarian facili-
ties. Indeed, in 1989, 20,682 of the 25,616 private schools in the
United States were religiously affiliated.3 76 Because of this large
number of sectarian schools and the possible shift of state funds to
these institutions under a broad-based choice plan, constitutional
challenges may arise. As with other sections of this study, proposed
legislation and executive action from the state of Ohio will be
featured.
Three new voucher-oriented bills were introduced into the state of
Ohio during 1992 that have not yet been called to a vote.377 House
Bill 635 would create a voucher program, 378 House Bill 825 would
require private, sectarian schools to issue a statement that partici-
pating students are not compelled to adhere to any specific reli-
gion,3 79 and House Bill 851 would submit the issue of private secta-
rian school participation in choice programs to the electorate for an
upcoming referendum.38 0 The Governor of Ohio's office began inter-
nal action on the bills and produced a document known as the Ohio
Scholarship Plan.3 1 1 The plan promotes deregulation of the state's
school system, and one of its major tenets is the involvement of pri-
vate sectarian schools in the school choice program. The plan pro-
374. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....").
375. 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). In Davis, an action was brought to compel the State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction to comply with the statute creating the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program. The program is designed to aid low-income children in attending nonsectarian
private schools. Id. at 462. Teachers' unions, administrators' organizations, and civil rights groups
intervened to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 465. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that: (1) the choice program complied with the uniformity clause requiring the legisla-
ture to provide for establishment of district schools as nearly uniform as practicable; and (2) the
choice program complied with the public purpose doctrine. Id. at 473, 477. See also supra notes
141-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Davis decision):
376. Joseph R. McKinney, Special Education and Establishment Clause, 65 W. EDuc. L. REP.
I, 4 (1991) [hereinafter McKinney, Special Education].
377. See supra notes 4, 116-21 and accompanying text (detailing the provisions of the three
Ohio House Bills).
378. 1992 Ohio H.B. 635, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1992).
379. 1992 Ohio H.B. 825, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (July 15, 1992).
380. 1992 Ohio H.B. 851, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Aug. 28, 1992).
381. See OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4.
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vides for tuition vouchers worth between $1,600 and $3,000, de-
pending on the student's grade in school, with increases provided for
subsequent years.382 There is no provision preventing the use of the
vouchers for purely religious reasons.
The United Sates Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion,3 3 applied the Establishment Clause to the states through the
doctrine of "selective incorporation" under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and set boundaries restricting the scope of permissible reim-
bursement.38 4 In Everson, the Court upheld a New Jersey statute
authorizing reimbursement to parents for expenses incurred in the
transportation of children to sectarian and secular schools."8 5 The
Court placed significant limits on such aid, however, stating:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion
... .In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
...was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and
State."386
1. The Lemon Test
For more than 20 years, Lemon v. Kurtzman38 7 has provided the
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of statutes under the
Establishment Clause. Lemon concerned efforts by Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island to reimburse private sectarian schools for teacher
salaries and secular educational services. 88 While holding that the
laws violated the Establishment Clause, the Lemon Court fashioned
a three-pronged test to determine whether such statutes were in ac-
cordance with the Constitution. First, the Court held that a statute
must have some secular legislative purpose.38 9 Second, the principal
or primary effect of the statute must be one that neither advances
382. Id. at 4.
383. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
384. Id. at 15-16.
385. Id. at 18.
386. Id. at 15-16.
387. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
388. Id. at 609-10.
389. Id. at 612.
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nor inhibits religion.3 90 And third, the statute must not foster exces-
sive government "entanglement" with religion.391 The Court found
that although the legislative intent of the reimbursement plans at
issue was not to advance religion, the plans entailed excessive gov-
ernmental entanglement with religion and thus failed to pass consti-
tutional muster.392
Two years later, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted another
statute to reimburse parents for tuition in sectarian schools without
restricting parents or schools with respect to the use of the money.
In Sloan v. Lemon,39 3 the Supreme Court applied the three-pronged
Lemon test and held that the statute had the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion. 394 Rejecting the state's argument that parents were
"mere conduits" for public aid to sectarian schools, the Court
stated:
We think it plain that this is quite unlike the sort of "indirect" and "inci-
dental" benefits that flowed to sectarian schools from programs aiding all
parents by supplying bus transportation and secular textbooks for their chil-
dren. Such benefits were carefully restricted to the purely secular side of
church-affiliated institutions and provided no special aid for those who had
chosen to support religious schools. Yet such aid approached the "verge" of
the constitutionally impermissible. . . . In Lemon v. Kurtzman, we declined
to allow Everson to be used as the "platform for yet further steps" in grant-
ing assistance to "institutions whose legitimate needs are growing and whose
interests have substantial political support." ... Again today we decline to
approach or overstep the "precipice" against which the Establishment
Clause protects. 39 5
Ohio's proposed voucher program, as listed in the Ohio Scholar-
ship Plan, makes no mention of how the money will be delivered
over to the private sectarian schools or just what the vouchers will
be used for. Presumably, they may go toward those "purposes"
ruled unconstitutional in Lemon.
The second prong of the Lemon test is embodied in the Court's
decision in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.396 In that
case, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law that aided
parochial schools, holding that it violated the Establishment Clause
390. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
391. Id. at 613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 644, 674 (1970)).
392. Id. at 612-13.
393. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
394. Id. at 832-33.
395. Id. at 832 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original).
396. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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and was thus unconstitutional. 97 The law provided direct monetary
grants for the maintenance and repair of the facilities of nonpublic
schools serving a high concentration of pupils from low-income fam-
ilies, tuition reimbursement to parents of students attending such
schools, and income tax benefits to those parents who did not qualify
for tuition reimbursements. 98
The New York law satisfied the first prong of the Lemon test.
The Court found a secular legislative purpose for the statute: pre-
serving a healthy and safe environment for schoolchildren and pro-
moting pluralism and diversity among public and nonpublic
schools.3 99 But the maintenance and repair provisions, tuition reim-
bursements, and tax deductions all failed under the second prong;
the Court found that the legislation had the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion. ° Part of the Court's opinion seems particularly
devastating to the contentions of school choice proponents that such
plans will benefit educational choices of the poor. The opinion of the
Court stated that:
In its attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between
public and nonpublic education, the State has taken a step which can only
be regarded as one "advancing" religion. However great our sympathy...
for the burdens experienced by those who must pay public school taxes at
the same time that they support other schools because of the constraints of
"conscience and discipline," . .. [our sympathy] may [not] . ..justify an
eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now firmly
397. Id. at 798.
398. Id. at 762-65. According to N.Y. Laws 1972, c. 414 § I (amending N.Y. Educ. Law, art.
12 §§ 549-553 (Supp. 1972-1973)), schools received grants of $30 per student (or $40 per student
if the school's facilities were more than 5 years old). Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762-65. To qualify for
the reimbursement plan, parents had to have an annual taxable income of less than $5,000, and
the amount of reimbursement was limited to $50 for grade school students and $100 for each high
school student. The deduction available to parents not qualifying for the reimbursement ranged
from $1,000 per dependent for families with an adjusted income of less than $9,000 to zero for
families with an adjusted income of $25,000 or more. Id. at 764-66.
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist dissented in
part. They argued that while the repair and maintenance provisions were unconstitutional, the
tuition reimbursement and tax deductions plans should have been upheld. Id. at 798 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting in part).
399. Id. at 773.
400. Id. at 774. The Court. reasoned that the entire repair budget of the sectarian schools could
have been funded by the program, not just that portion attributable to nonsectarian education.
Thus, some of the leftover funds could have financed religious education. Id. at 774, 779-80. The
Court also held that the effect of the tuition reimbursements was to provide financial support for
private sectarian schools, and thus its primary effect was to advance religion. Id. at 783, 785-89.
The tax deduction plan was found to have an effect similar to that of the tuition reimbursement
plan. Id. at 794. Whether or not any of the three provisions resulted in excessive state entangle-
ment with religion was not considered by the Court.
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implanted.4"'
Based on the above statement by the Court, the Ohio voucher
plan's emphasis on low-income students would not be enough to save
the plan.402 Further, it could be reasoned that since, in most in-
stances, members of religious organizations would have first priority
under the plan, the Ohio plan advances religion. Inasmuch as there
is no designation in the plan as to where the money would go or
what it would be used for, the Lemon test's "effects" prong would
also be breached.
The concept of "entanglement" has also been central to several of
the Court's decisions in this area. In Meek v. Pittenger,40 3 the state
of Pennsylvania, party to the original case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,
passed statutes which provided for the lending of instructional
materials and equipment to sectarian elementary and secondary
schools.4 °4 The statutes also provided children at those schools with
auxiliary services including counseling, testing, and psychological
service.40 5 The Supreme Court ruled that both statutes violated the
Establishment Clause.40 6 Although the statutes were said to be
based on secular purposes, the Court held that the lending of mater-
ials and equipment "has the unconstitutional primary effect of ad-
vancing religion because of the predominantly religious character of
the schools benefiting from the Act."407 Regarding the auxiliary ser-
vices given directly to children at the sectarian schools, the Court
also stated that excessive entanglement was certainly present if the
state was to be certain that its publicly employed personnel did not
advance the religious mission of the schools.40 8 "Entanglement" was
also found by the Court in Nyquist 0 9 in that the statute at issue
required a further taxing of the state budget and the need for con-
tinuing appropriations to provide necessary funds to what was
clearly a sectarian enterprise.4 10
The Ohio plan clearly presents similar entanglement problems.
401. Id. at 788-89 (citation omitted).
402. OHIo SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4, at 6.
403. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
404. Id. at 352-53.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 367-72.
407. Id. at 363.
408. Id. at 370.
409. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
410. Id. at 796-97.
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Under the plan, students across the entire state would be eligible for
vouchers between $1,600 and $3,000,11 meaning that millions of
dollars from the state budget would be allocated for this purpose.
Since these figures are designed to increase, new allocations would
have to be made each year by the legislature, clearly violating the
Nyquist holding. Furthermore, because the overwhelming majority
of private schools are also religiously affiliated, fully 80 percent of
the dollars would be sent to sectarian institutions.
Entanglement could also be found in the "Accountability" section
of the plan. Student achievement in all schools participating in
Ohio's choice program will be "determined on a yearly basis by
utilizing a uniform testing program for public and private schools
applied on a national standard base. ' 412 Until such a base is estab-
lished, the Ohio proficiency exam will be used.4"' If such a standard
is followed, it will require a massive amount of hours from state
personnel to monitor the requisite procedures in private schools.
This involvement would also run afoul of Lemon and render the
state plan unconstitutional.
Court decisions concerning state aid to private sectarian schools
are far from consistent.41 4 But the Lemon test has remained as the
Supreme Court's standard throughout. There are variations of the
411. OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4, at 4.
412. Id. at 10.
413. Id.
414. Although textbook loans to sectarian schools have been upheld, Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 255 (1977), loans for instructional materials and equipment were not, Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 (1975). The supplying of state-prepared standardized tests, scoring
services, and state reimbursement for costs arising from the administration of the state-prepared
test were upheld, Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,662 (1980), but a state law
providing for reimbursement to private schools for costs associated with state-mandated record-
keeping and testing of subjects was struck down, Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Reli-
gious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973). The Court has sanctioned property tax exemptions,
Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and upheld tax deductions for tuition expenses, trans-
portation, and taxes, when the deductions were available to parents of students attending private
schools, Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Trans-
portation costs have been upheld, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), but reim-
bursements of tuition payments to low-income parents have been struck down, Sloan v. Lemon,
413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973). Annual state subsidies to sectarian higher educational institutions for
nonsectarian purposes are permissible, Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971), but state subsidies to private, sectarian primary and secondary
schools for building maintenance and repair is not, Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798. A program for
speech, hearing, and remedial services to private school students on private school grounds was
held unconstitutional, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), although diagnostic speech, hear-
ing, and psychological services on the premises of private schools passed constitutional muster,
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244.
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Lemon test, though, that could influence the "choice" enterprise rel-
ative to private sectarian schools.
2. The "Endorsement Test"
A case suggesting that the Court might consider modifying the
stance it took in Lemon is Lynch v. Donnelly.415 Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Lynch, maintained that the
Establishment Clause is violated in two situations. 416 The first oc-
curs when government becomes excessively entangled with a reli-
gious institution, resulting in some religious groups gaining access to
governmental powers not shared by all and possibly leading to a po-
litical constituency defined along religious lines.4 7 The second, more
direct infringement occurs when government endorses or disap-
proves of a certain religion.41 8 One of the purposes of the Establish
ment Clause, according to Justice O'Connor, is to avoid political di-
visions. 419 Her concurring opinion focused on institutional entan-
glement and endorsement or disapproval of religion in an attempt to
clarify the Lemon test.42°
The endorsement test suggested by Justice O'Connor was grafted
onto the primary or principal effects prong of Lemon, which she
contended asks whether the government's actual purpose is to en-
dorse or disapprove of religion.421 She reasoned that the strength of
this application was that it avoided invalidation of some of the laws
that the Court has upheld even though they may advance or inhibit
religion, such as tax exemptions for religious organizations.422 Ap-
plying the endorsement test to the facts of Lynch, she held that the
purpose of including a nativity scene in a holiday display was not
promotion of the religious content of the scene, but rather the cele-
bration of a traditional holiday. 423 She then concluded that the na-
415. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
416. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
420. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
421. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
422. Id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
423. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Lynch involved an action challenging the inclusion
of a nativity scene in a Christmas display maintained by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Id.
at 671. O'Connor argued that a government celebration of Christmas is so common that it is
generally not understood to be an endorsement of religion. O'Connor went on to explain that the
nativity scene, a traditional symbol of the holiday, is commonly displayed with purely secular
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tivity scene merely acknowledged religion and did not endorse it;
thus, it passed her modified "endorsement" test.424 It is important to
note that the endorsement test was adopted in County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union,42 5 another religious symbol case.
In the majority opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun held that Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch provided a more sound analytical
framework for evaluating religious symbols than did the Lynch ma-
jority opinion.426
In School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 27 Justice
O'Connor again applied her endorsement analysis in another con-
curring opinion. At issue in Grand Rapids were programs offered by
the school district in which parochial school students could attend
symbols. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
424. Id. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
425. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
426. Id. at 595. Whether or not Justice Blackmun would apply the use of the endorsement test
to cases not involving religious symbols is questionable, given his emphasis on cases involving
religious symbols.
In a separate opinion in County of Allegheny, Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 655
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy set forth a new analyti-
cal model, the "coercion" approach, for analyzing this type of case. Id. at 659-63 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). He noted that Lemon provided the applicable frame-
work for analyzing a petitioner's claims, but at the same time, he questioned the wisdom of retain-
ing the Lemon test. Id. Justice Kennedy suggested that several earlier opinions of the Court would
require eliminating all contact between government and religion if they were to be strictly applied.
Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Establishment Clause,
however, granted the government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating religion. Id.
To not do so would result in a latent hostility toward religion, to the detriment of religion. Id.
According to Justice Kennedy, the case law on the Establishment Clause reveals two limiting
principles. Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). First, government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion. Id. Second, government may not give
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it establishes a de facto state religion. Id. He
acknowledged that the Court's earliest decisions had rejected coercion as a test for Establishment
Clause violations. Id. at 660 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He noted,
however, that those previous decisions discussed direct coercion only, and not acts of indirect coer-
cion. Id. at 660-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy
proposed that the proper analysis would be to apply Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Walz to
determine whether a governmental act recognizing religion is more than just passive and symbolic.
Id. at 661-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Where the act is passive
and does not amount to sponsorship, any benefit to religion is unlikely to present a risk of estab-
lishment as long as the act is not inherently coercive. Id. Because the city sought only to celebrate
the Christmas season, the displays fell within the tradition of government accommodation. Id. at
663 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Minus a coercive element, Justice
Kennedy would have found the religious displays to be constitutional. Id. at 664-67 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
427. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see infra notes 458-59 and accompanying text (likening the tax
scheme in Ball to the proposed Ohio plan).
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public school classes during the regular school day ("Shared Time")
or shortly after school ("Community Education"). 28 Justice Wil-
liam Brennan, writing for the Court, applied the Lemon test and
held that the program had the primary or principal effect of advanc-
ing religion.42 9 Justice O'Connor concurred in part, distinguishing
between a parochial school teacher paid by the state, which would
violate the Establishment Clause, and a public school teacher who
taught parochial school students, which would not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause.4 30  The former situation is analogous to
broad-based school choice plans like those found in Ohio, Minne-
sota, and Nebraska, because funds to pay parochial school teachers
under such schemes come indirectly from the state. Applying Jus-
tice O'Connor's endorsement analysis to school choice, therefore,
would result in a finding that such a plan violates the Establishment
Clause.
3. The "Coercion" Test
Another case possibly modifying the Lemon test is Lee v. Weis-
man.431 In that case, the Supreme Court was asked whether a bene-
diction or invocation invoking a deity and delivered by clergy at a
public school ceremony had the principal effect of advancing reli-
gion in violation the Establishment Clause. 3 2 Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy delivered the majority opinion in Weisman, and naturally
based it on his concurring opinion in County of Allegheny,43 3 where
428. Id. at 375-77. On the same day that Grand Rapids was decided, the Court held in Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), that New York City's use of public funds to pay public school
employees to teach in parochial schools violated the Establishment Clause. Justice O'Connor dis-
sented in Aguilar and concurred and dissented in part in Grand Rapids.
429. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 383, 397. Justice Brennan cited three reasons for his holding:
(1) teachers might have been involved in religious instruction; (2) the programs might have pro-
vided a symbolic link between religion and education; and (3) the programs might have indirectly
subsidized religious functions. Id. at 397.
430. Id. at 398-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor
wrote:
When full-time parochial school teachers receive public funds to teach secular courses
to their parochial school students under parochial school supervision, I agree that the
program has the perceived and actual effect of advancing the religious aims of the
church-related schools. This is particularly the case where, as here, religion pervades
the curriculum and the teachers are accustomed to bring religion to play in everything
they teach.
Id. at 399-400 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
431. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
432. Id. at 2652.
433. 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring); see also supra note 426 and accom-
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he first announced his "coercion" analysis. The "coercion" test holds
that it is unconstitutional for public officials to be involved in reli-
gious activity that induces students to participate through public or
peer pressure. 4 ' This includes a prohibition against direct pressure
as well as indirect or subtle coercion which is psychological or social
in origin.' 6 The majority in Weisman held that inasmuch as gradu-
ation is a ceremony which students are subtly obligated to attend,
state authorized prayer at graduation coerces some students to com-
promise their beliefs.43 Although Justice Kennedy went to great
lengths in his opinion in Weisman to limit the holding to the facts of
the case,4"7 the decision could have implications for state aid to edu-
cation relating to "choice" in that the standard used to determine
constitutionality is one of coercion.
The inclusion of private sectarian schools in a choice program has
the potential for ensnaring Justice Kennedy's "coercion" test. Pri-
vate schools, both secular and sectarian, provide primarily academic
programs and, in contrast to public schools, rarely offer generalized
or vocational courses of study.4 38 The students who attend such
schools tend to score better on achievement tests than their public
school counterparts,43 9 have higher attendance rates,440 and have
fewer behavioral problems.44'
The state of Ohio's proposed choice voucher plan serves as an ex-
ample of when the "coercion" test might be applied. Proposed house
bills already before the legislature4 2 and the Governor's Ohio
Scholarship Plan"' work in concert to effectuate this possibility.
Ohio House Bills 635414 and 825 41 both announce the participation
of private sectarian schools in the state's choice program. Ohio
panying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's coercion analysis in County of Allegheny).
434. Id. at 659-62.
435. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2658-59.
436. Id. at 2661.
437. Id. at 2655.
438. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CONTRACTOR RE-
PORT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 282 (1981).
439. Id. at 172.
440. Id. at 102.
441. Id. at 102-03.
442. See 1992 Ohio H.B. 635, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1992); 1992
Ohio H.B. 825, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (July 15, 1992); 1992 Ohio H.B. 851,
119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Aug. 28, 1992).
443. OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4.
444. 1992 Ohio H.B. 635.
445. 1992 Ohio H.B. 825.
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House Bill 635 also stipulates that a sectarian school that accepts a
student under the plan must adopt a statement that "the school
shall not require any voucher student to participate in any religious
activity."446 The Ohio plan takes this issue a step further under its
guidelines on admissions to such schools, permitting the private sec-
tarian schools to "require attendance at, but not require participa-
tion in, religious activities of the school."" 7 The activity that can be
derived from such a statement is similar to that declared unconstitu-
tional under Weisman. There, students were said to be subject to
the "coercion" of officials by being forced to listen to a school
prayer at graduation ceremonies.448 While school officials defended
the action by stating that students did not have to listen to the
prayer or, in the alternative, could have decided not to attend the
ceremonies,449 the Court's response was telling. To wit, the Court
noted that attendance at graduation is important to students.450 It is
the culmination exercise of several years of school activity and
hence is "one of life's most significant occasions."' 51 While attend-
ance may not be required, a student cannot just willy nilly decide to
be absent, for being absent would mean "forfeiture of those tangible
benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all her
high school years. '"452
By analogy, students under the Ohio choice plan, who carry the
state's dollar, may feel that they would forfeit the chance of a "bet-
ter" education by not going to a private sectarian school. Should
they go to such schools, they cannot just decide not to participate in
any religious activity, for the trappings of such religious activity will
be replete within the institution. Hence, as in Weisman, there would
be the subtle pressure of conformity induced by the non-verbal
messages that ring out of a sectarian institution. There would also
be present the direct coercion held unconstitutional by Weisman.
Students under the Ohio plan are compelled to attend religious ac-
tivities of the sectarian schools involved in the choice program. 53
446. 1992 Ohio H.B. 635, at 5; see also 1992 Ohio H.B. 825, at 6 ("[T]he school shall not
require any voucher student to profess any religious tenet or adhere to any article of faith or
religious doctrine as a condition of admission").
447. OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4, at 7.
448. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992).
449. Id. at 2659.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4, at 7. However, the students are not required to
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This may signal to students that the state is pushing them to adhere
to a particular way of thinking inconsistent with their values and
background. This is similar to the kind of pressure that Justice Ken-
nedy found wanting under his "coercion" test. As a result, Ohio's
proposed legislation on choice appears to be unconstitutional under
this test.
4. Can Judicial Support of Sectarian Schools Save Choice?
Proponents of choice often cite two cases to support their position:
Mueller v. Allen4 54 and Witters v. Washington Department of Ser-
vices for the Blind.455 In Mueller, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4
vote, upheld a Minnesota law which permitted residents to deduct
expenses for tuition, textbooks, and transportation for students at
both public and private schools. 56 In validating the law, the major-
ity reaffirmed both Lemon and Nyquist, but indicated that states
have discretion in tax statutes, especially when they benefit all stu-
dents, whether or not the students attend a public or private
school. 57
It is doubtful that the Ohio plan could gain strong support from
the Mueller decision because the plan is not based on a tax statute
and it in no way parallels the Minnesota law. In fact, Ohio's pro-
posed plan is more like that found in School District of the City of
Grand Rapids v. Ball,458 where the Court saw no "meaningful dis-
tinction . . .between aid to the student and aid to the [sectarian]
school."'459 To wit, there is no language in the Ohio plan that deter-
mines how funds will imbue to the private schools complying with
the statute.
In the other case relied on by choice supporters, a unanimous
Court in Witters ruled that a state payment for vocational education
to a blind student did not upset the three prongs of Lemon simply
participate in these activities. Id.
454. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
455. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
456. 463 U.S. at 391.
457. Id. at 394.
458. 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see also supra notes 427-30 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding in Grand Rapids and the application of Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis).
459. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 396. But see Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S.
Ct. 2462, 2469 n.1 1 (1993) (noting that there would not have even been an Establishment Clause
issue had IDEA funds used to pay for a deaf student's interpreter in a sectarian school been
disbursed directly to the parents rather than the school).
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because the student chose to use the money to attend bible school.46 0
In its decision, the Court emphasized the minimal amount of funds
going toward the religious program and the likelihood that only one
person would get religious training with public funds.461 As noted,
the Ohio plan is apposite; unlike the plan in Witters, large numbers
of students and a large amount of funds are likely to end up sup-
porting sectarian schools.
Even if Witters could be interpreted to validate the awarding of
grants to the parents of sectarian school students, there is some
question as to whether it would apply to elementary and secondary
students. The Court has, in the past, subjected public funding of
higher education to considerably less Establishment Clause scrutiny
than public funding of elementary and secondary education. In Til-
ton v. Richardson6 2 the Court stated, "There are generally signifi-
cant differences between the religious aspects of church-related in-
stitutions of higher learning and parochial elementary and
secondary schools. . . .There is substance to the contention that
college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to reli-
gious indoctrination. 46 3
Research has also shown that the Court has found Justice
O'Connor's endorsement analysis particularly useful in cases involv-
ing the education of children between kindergarten and the twelfth
grade.46' The impressionability of young children has led the Court
to follow the general rule that the wall of separation between church
and state must be higher in elementary and secondary education. 6 5
460. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-90 (1986).
461. Id. at 488.
462. 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding the constitutionality of the Higher Education Facilities
Act of 1963, which provided federal construction grants to colleges and universities, and finding
that providing such grants to church-related schools did not have the effect or purpose of promot-
ing religion).
463. Id. at 685-86.
464. Julie K. Underwood, Changing Establishment Analysis Within and Outside the Context
of Education, 33 How. L.J. 54, 56 (1990) [hereinafter Underwood, Establishment Analysis];
Julie K. Underwood, Establishment of Religion and the Financing of Schools, 17 EDuc. CONSID-
ERATIONS. 15, 16 (1990) [hereinafter Underwood, Religion and Financing].
465. Underwood, Establishment Analysis, supra note 464, at 56. The Court explained this
protectiveness of students in secondary and elementary education settings in Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987). The court in Edwards struck down a Louisiana statute that prohibited the
teaching of evolution in public schools unless it was accompanied by instruction in "creation sci-
ence." Id. at 578-79. In holding that the statute was motivated solely by a religious purpose, the
Court stated:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establish-
ment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families entrust public schools
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This is a consistent theme, for in Weisman, the majority, using the
"coercion" test, indicated that its decision was being made precisely
because the audience in question consisted of schoolchildren.4 66
Such students are susceptible to peer pressure as well as the pres-
ence of authority relative to the development of religious values. 67
The voucher plan in Ohio obviously relates to students in primary
and secondary schools and is therefore not buoyed by the decision in
Witters.
The Ohio Scholarship Plan's use of choice vouchers must be scru-
tinized for additional reasons. It carries an anti-discrimination
clause, but permits students belonging to the various religious sects
to have priority for' admission to religious schools.46 8 This could
mean that some students will never have the opportunity to attend
these religious schools. While the private schools are forbidden to
consider race in their policies, they can consider gender and disabil-
ity. 469 In the latter area this is an important issue, especially for
Ohio and states with similar choice legislation. In 1990, the United
States Department of Education issued an executive opinion indicat-
ing that private schools did not have to accept handicapped chil-
dren.170 This has far reaching implications inasmuch as the writer of
that opinion is today Ohio's Superintendent of Public Instruction.
17 1
The tuition voucher program in Ohio poses a number of concerns
of which educators, legislators, and attorneys in that state - and
others like it - must be conscious. The legal problems notwith-
standing, there is the issue of a mass desertion by the best and
brightest students. Non-magnet public schools could again become
with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding
that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may
conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such
institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary. . . . The State
exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance require-
ments, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models and the
children's susceptibility to peer pressure. . . . Furthermore, "[t]he public school is at
once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our
common destiny. In no activity of the state is it more vital to keep out divisive forces
than in its schools ....
Id. at 583-84 (quoting Illinois ex. rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)).
466. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
467. Id. at 2659.
468. OHIO SCHOLARSHIP PLAN, supra note 4, at 6-7.
469. Id.
470. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 68.
471. Dr. Ted Sanders, State Superintendent of Public Instruction for Ohio.
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warehouses for only the poor with legislative allocation at a trickle.
The public schools are clearly ill. The question is whether choice in
general and choice vouchers in particular are the right medicine to
ensure survival.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to inform the reader of the complexities
of the school "choice" enterprise. The enactment of choice legisla-
tion has implications for legislators, attorneys, school personnel, and
students who are either beneficiaries or victims of these programs.
Choice programs entail significant hurdles for desegregation, disa-
bility, and the Establishment Clause. The progression of case law
from Brown to Freeman suggests that choice may contribute to the
re-creation of predominantly one-race schools. However, the
precepts of Brown, as supported by Freeman, may serve as impor-
tant indicators that the judiciary will not support a return to segre-
gation. The challenge for legislators and school districts, like those
in Ohio and other "choice" states, is to create operating policies that
maximize opportunities for students while minimizing segregative
results. The danger that must be guarded against is a sophisticated
return to segregation under the guise of a desperate attempt to at-
tack the ,decline of quality education.
School choice programs also affect disabled students. The rights
of these students are created and protected by federal statutes and
corresponding state laws. Nevertheless, interpretation of these legal
protections, while ostensibly designed to help disabled children, may
actually serve as a hindrance to decision-making on the part of par-
ents. Research in this area points to the fact that parents of disabled
children may not have the "choices" that accrue to the parents of
able-bodied students. This may be a violation of the aforementioned
federal statutes, of which school personnel must be cognizant before
fully implementing a choice program.
Choice involving private, sectarian schools may run into difficulty
with the three prongs of the Lemon test. Any choice program must
have a predominantly secular purpose, must neither advance nor in-
hibit religion, and must not foster government entanglement with
religion. One key to a viable choice program involving private
schools, then, is the formation of a plan that keeps government in-
volvement to a minimum. This, however, raises other issues such as
those found in the Milwaukee experiment, where limited govern-
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ment oversight created student victims of choice programs through
schools that were forced to shut down.
Of equal importance with regard to private sectarian schools is
the definition of "establishment." Under the Lemon test, the Su-
preme Court has wavered back and forth between broad and narrow
interpretations of the First Amendment of the Constitution. More
significantly, however, the Court has fashioned other tests involving
the Establishment Clause that may ultimately decide the fate of
school choice plans.
But there are additional concerns that those involved in school
reform must face in this era of academic uncertainty. While the
purpose of reform must certainly be to improve schools and thereby
increase student achievement, there must also be other reasons for
reform. Reform must do more than teach more math, science, En-
glish, and basic skills. It must be more than lengthening the school
day, rewarding teachers, and placing a heavy focus on learning com-
puter skills. Reform must aid students in developing skills and atti-
tudes that are necessary to function in a democratic society and in
developing a commitment to justice, equality, and good citizenship.
These latter issues were noticeably missing from A Nation at
Risk, 472 and this serves as a basic criticism of that report and others
like it. The report was a rallying cry for a very complicated set of
problems, not an analysis of those problems. Hence, the reaction
around the country was to try to find quick fixes for complex
problems without surveying the causes or victims. School choice
may be one of those quick fixes.
This study has attempted to demonstrate that choice has gone
through little analysis before being implemented by school systems.
Detractors of choice have charged that this is an elitist approach for
dealing with students and does more harm than good for many of
the persons such programs are designed to aid. Hence, choice may
not improve achievement for those who need it most; choice is more
of a selection process designed to give those students already in the
circle of success a boost of performance.
These statements can now be made because there has been some
assessment of choice. The Carnegie Foundation, for example, has
determined that legislatures have initiated most public school choice
programs without addressing school funding disparities and without
472. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the conclusions of the report).
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fully informing parents and other citizens about the programs. As
for choice involving private schools, promises in those schools that
are participating are "outdistancing reality." And the reality is that
most private schools will not accept students most in need because
this would relieve those schools of their competitive edge in recruit-
ing the "better" students.
What is called for then is a reform movement which authors like
Henry Levin call a "restructuring" or "drastic revamping of public
schools in terms of their ...effectiveness. 473 Many researchers in
the choice area have come to the same conclusion. Most students
will continue to be taught in the district of residence. The appropri-
ate public policy, therefore, is to increase efforts to improve the
quality of those schools whenever they are deemed to be inadequate.
What is needed under "restructuring" is a guarantee of accountabil-
ity from schools and their staffs. The Carnegie Report cites, among
other things, the demonstrable effectiveness of school programs that
include information on student academic progress, attendance, grad-
uation rates, curriculum standards, and parental participation.4 74
Such a program would be evaluated by a state appointed team of
education experts,475 similar to accreditation teams for colleges. The
team would have the power to sanction schools and to even replace
leadership if sufficient evidence of a positive change was not pro-
vided.4 76 However, even this is not enough if true reform is desired.
Sufficient funds to educate students must be provided to all school
districts. This, too, poses several legal issues. States are now postur-
ing through concerns of finance equity; Kentucky, Texas, and Mon-
tana have already brought forth significant case law, and the battle
is ongoing in Ohio. While no one has the formula to aid school sys-
tems in better educating their students, we do know from the experi-
ence in East Harlem, New York, that student achievement in-
creased with the infusion of good and committed teachers, good and
committed administrators, planning on the part of those personnel,
the absence of per-pupil funding disparities, and adequate funding
from government sources. While it was not present in East Harlem,
added to this list should be a desire to educate all students regard-
less of background. This is the needed "restructuring" of American
473. Levin, Vouchers and School Choice, supra note 20, at 279.
474. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 80.
475. Id.
476. Id.
[Vol. 43:1
1993] EDUCATIONAL CHOICE 75
education, and it can be done in any school system with or without
the inclusion of "choice."
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APPENDIX A
Summary of Existing Choice Programs
1. Alabama
Under its "Schools of Choice" plan,477 Alabama's school districts
may, at their option, participate in either intradistrict or interdis-
trict choice programs. 478 To date, however, no school system has
chosen to participate in either of these programs.4 79 Alabama's leg-
islation includes provisions for both magnet and alternative
schools."8" Such programs already exist in major cities such as
Huntsville, Montgomery, and Mobile.48'
2. Alaska
As of yet, no choice legislation has been introduced in Alaska.
The Governor of Alaska did establish a task force on choice, which
recommended the creation of charter schools and interdistrict trans-
fers, but the state Commission declined to support a voucher
program. 82
3. Arizona
Arizona is currently examining a comprehensive school choice
bill.' 8 The bill, which was introduced in the Arizona House, calls
for statewide open enrollment within public schools. 8' The bill al-
lows all children between the ages of six and twenty-one to attend
any school located within their attendance area if they meet the re-
quirements of that school. 85 The governing board will establish the
pupil enrollment for the school and each grade. 8" Schools are re-
quired to consider disabled students for acceptance under the same
provisions used for nondisabled students, so long as the school is
able to meet the disabled student's individualized education
program. 87
Beginning in 1995, parents may request enrollment in a nonresi-
477. ALA. CODE § 16-3-20.1 (Supp. 1992).
478. CARNEGIE REPORT. supra note 42, at 99.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. 1993 Ariz. H.B. 2366, 41st Ariz. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Feb. 9, 1993).
484. Id. at 5.
485. Id. at 6.
486. Id.
487. Id.
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dent school by submitting an application before February 1 of the
previous school year. 88 School districts are not compelled to provide
transportation for the transferring students.4 89 In addition, the Gov-
ernor's Education Reform Task Force, in 1991, considered a propo-
sal to grant a voucher for students currently enrolled in private ele-
mentary and secondary schools in the state, with the intent of
expanding it in the future. °
4. Arkansas
A comprehensive open enrollment plan, patterned after the Min-
nesota law,491 was passed in March of 1989.492 This legislation
openly promotes competition for students between school districts as
a means of improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of Arkan-
sas's schools.493 The law includes limitations on transfers -
designed to protect court-ordered desegregation plans and racial
balances in school districts - and measures to prevent the recruit-
ment of gifted students and student athletes. 94 Students transfer-
ring to a nonresident school district are ineligible for interscholastic
athletic competition during the first year of the transfer.4 95 Under
the law, parents bear the costs of transportation; no exceptions or
special provisions are made for economically disadvantaged stu-
dents.4 96 State per-pupil aid follows a transferring student to the re-
ceiving school district. 97
5. California
A California statute gives local school districts the authority to
grant students permission to enroll in schools outside their resident
district boundaries. Additionally, the governing board of any school
district may establish one or more alternative schools within a dis-
trict.4 98 The law requires that transportation be provided 499 and that
488. Id. at 7.
489. Id. at 8.
490. Education Reform the Money Myth, ARIZ. REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, Nov. 21, 1991,
at A14.
491. See infra notes 570-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota choice
legislation).
492. Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 1989, ARK, CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-206 to -223
(Michie Supp. 1991).
493. Id. § 6-18-206(a)(2).
494. Id. paras. (a)(3), (g)(l)-(7).
495. Id. para. (e).
496. Id. para. (c).
497. LEGISLATION REVIEW. supra note 5, at 6 (1992 Update).
498. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 58500 (West 1989).
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the county board of education adopt a plan to conduct an outreach
program to inform every parent of the opportunity to choose a
school for their child.500
In addition to the enacted legislation, a California-based organi-
zation, the Excellence through Choice in Education League ("Ex-
CEL"), conducted a campaign to place an initiative on the 1992
state ballot that would have provided a voucher to students wanting
to attend public or private schools in the state."' The scholarship
value for each child would have provided at least 50 percent of the
average amount of state and local government spending per public
school student in grades kindergarten through twelve. 02 In essence,
this initiative would have allowed any school to a become charter
school.60 However, the California Supreme Court ruled that the ini-
tiative lacked the requisite validated signatures, and it was subse-
quently removed from the ballot.504
Early in 1992, several Democratic state legislators proposed char-
ter school legislation 5 5 which would substantially deregulate charter
schools but would still require charter schools to meet specific edu-
cational standards. 0 In July of 1993, the Governor of California
signed a bill allowing every school to receive monies from the State
School Fund if it establishes a policy of open enrollment within its
district for residents of the district. 07 Also in July of that year, the
Governor signed a bill authorizing the governing board of any
school district to admit pupils residing in another school district to
attend any school in the nonresident district.50 8
6. Colorado
The Colorado "Public Schools of Choice" plan was passed in
1990 as part of the state's Education Appropriation Act. 509 It man-
499. Id. § 58512.
500. Id. § 58501.
501. Paul Jacobs, Backers of Education Bonds Cite Jobs, Overcrowding, L.A. TIMES. May 27,
1992, at A3.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 100.
505. David L. Kirp, How to Create Welfare Hostels for the Intellect, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1992,
at M6.
506. Id.
507. 1993 Cal. A.B. 1114, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (March 2, 1993).
508. 1992 Cal. A.B. 19, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Dec. 7, 1992).
509. Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-36-101 to -106
(West Supp. 1992).
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dates that every school district adopt policies and procedures for en-
rollment in particular programs or schools within each school dis-
trict . 1 0 Limitations on enrollment in such intradistrict programs are
permitted only if there is a lack of space within a program or school
or if there is a need to maintain compliance with a desegregation
plan.51 ' Transportation funds are not provided. 12
The plan also establishes a pilot interdistrict choice program, in-
tended to be in place until July 1, 1997, in which the state depart-
ment of education can select no more than three participating school
districts from representative geographical areas of the state.5 13 Ad-
ditionally, the plan includes a grant awards program to school dis-
tricts participating in the pilot program. 1 It also creates a "Schools
of Choice" fund, whereby funds set aside for the interdistrict pro-
gram are to be utilized for the direct and indirect costs of imple-.
menting and administering the pilot program. 1 5
7. Connecticut
A Task Force to Study the Feasibility of Establishing and Main-
taining Charter Schools was created by the Connecticut Legislature
in 1991.516 In 1992, the Education Committee of the Connecticut
General Assembly held hearings on a bill designed to implement the
Task Force's findings.517 However, the bill never made it out of
committee because a prescribed, legislatively-imposed deadline was
not met.518 The education committee report became Legislative Bill
323 in 1993, but failed to pass the Assembly because legislators felt
it was politically unfeasible to put state funds into charter schools
when the public schools were desperately in need of funds.51 9
8. Delaware
Delaware presently does not have a choice program in place, and
510. Id. § 22-36-101(1).
511. Id. paras. (3)(a), (d). See id. for additional bases for limitations on enrollment under the
plan. The city of Denver is excluded from the plan because a court-ordered desegration plan is in
place. Katie Kerwin, Schools Open Boundaries, Cross Fingers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS. Aug.
25, 1991, at 6.
512. Kerwin, supra note 511, at 6.
513. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-36-102(l)(4) (West Supp. 1992).
514. Id. § 22-36-104(1).
515. Id. § 22-36-105.
516. LEGISLATION REVIEW. supra note 5, at 3 (1992 Update).
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Telephone interview with Peggy Gray, Clerk, Education Committee of the Connecticut
General Assembly (Sept. 1, 1993).
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there is no choice legislation currently before the state legislature. 2 0
9. Florida
During 1991, two choice proposals were introduced in the Florida
House. One would have created a statewide voucher choice pro-
gram, issuing certificates for students to attend public or private
schools. 21 This plan, however, was rejected by the legislature.522
The second choice proposal, which was enacted in 1992, calls for
vouchers for "at-risk" ninth grade students who are enrolled in
dropout prevention programs.523 Known as the Dropout Prevention
Act, the bill is a comprehensive dropout prevention program with
provisions for dropout retrieval activities 524 and educational alterna-
tive programs. 5
10. Georgia
A postsecondary options bill passed the Georgia General Assem-
bly in 1992.526 The bill stipulates that pupils may enroll in public or
private postsecondary institutions and receive dual credit towards
earning a high school diploma and a college degree. 7
11. Hawaii
Hawaii does not have a statewide choice program but permits
limited intradistrict and interdistrict transfers with the agreement of
both the sending and receiving schools.528
12. Idaho
The Idaho "Enrollment Options Program" passed the legislature
in 1990 and was implemented during the 1991-92 school year. 529
Under the plan, parents or guardians must submit applications by
February I for enrollment in a new district the following school
520. CARNEGIE REPORT. supra note 42, at 101.
521. Id. at 102.
522. Id.
523. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.2316 (West Supp. 1992).
524. "Dropout retrieval activities" are defined by the statute as "educational programs and
activities which identify and motivate students who have dropped out of school to reenter school in
order to obtain a high school diploma or its equivalent." Id. para. (3)(a).
525. "Educational alternatives programs" are educational programs "designed to offer varia-
tions of traditional instructional programs and strategies for the purpose of increasing the likeli-
hood that grade 4 through grade 12 students who are unmotivated or unsuccessful in traditional
programs remain in school and obtain a high school diploma or its equivalent." Id. para. (3)(b).
526. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-615a.l(b) (Harrison Supp. 1992).
527. Id.
528. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 102.
529. IDAHO CODE § 33-1402 (Supp. 1993).
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year."' Parents are responsible for transportation to and from the
school or to a bus stop within the receiving district.5 ' The law re-
stricts a student's participation in extracurricular activities after
transfer to another district. 2 Under the plan, no districts can pre-
vent students from leaving a school district, but any district may opt
not to receive pupils under the enrollment options program. 53 3
13. Illinois
In 1992, Illinois enacted an intradistrict open enrollment plan
which is subject to the space available in each school district. Resi-
dent students are given priority status and all other applicants must
participate in a lottery for the remaining spaces. 53 4
14. Indiana
Senate Bill 393 was first introduced into the Education Commit-
tee of the Indiana General Assembly in 1991, and was introduced
again in 1992.153 Both versions of the legislation "provide[d] schol-
arships for all children in the state to use at any school of their
choice, reduce[d] regulation of scholarship-redeeming schools and
g[ave] teachers and schools more autonomy, provide[d] for state-
wide testing, and add[ed] new measures to help preschool chil-
dren."5 6 However, the bill never made it out of the Education Com-
mittee during the 1993 legislative session.53 7
15. Iowa
In 1989, the Iowa legislature passed a comprehensive open enroll-
ment program 5 38 patterned upon the Minnesota plan. 53 '9 The goals of
the legislation included the elimination of the monopoly of the dis-
trict of residency and the promotion of competition between the dis-
tricts in order to motivate school improvement.540 Unfortunately, the
legislation contains no safeguard provisions to help schools that lose
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (1992 State Bar Edition).
535. LEGISLATION REVIEW. supra note 5, at 5 (1992 Update).
536. Id.
537. Telephone interview with Charles Myers, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Information
Service, Indiana General Assembly (Sept. I, 1993).
538. IOWA CODE ANN. § 282.18 (West Supp. 1993).
539. See infra notes 570-80 and accompanying text (examining the Minnesota choice
legislation).
540. IowA CODE ANN. § 282.18(1) (West Supp. 1993).
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students as a result of transfers.541
In the initial transfer application, parents must state the reasons
for requesting the transfer from one school district to another.542 In
addition, during the first year of enactment, the legislation afforded
resident districts the option of limiting student transfers to no more
than five percent of the district's total enrollment.5 43 Athletic re-
cruitment is also prohibited by the legislation. 5" Transportation
costs are paid by parents except where the student is eligible for free
or reduced-price school lunches.545 In general, transferring students
must remain in the new district of choice for four years unless their
family moves or their parents petition the district for a change. 546
16. Kansas
Numerous choice proposals have been introduced in the Kansas
legislature, but none have made it out of committee to date. 54 7
17. Kentucky
In 1989, Kentucky undertook a statewide educational restructur-
ing plan. The resulting legislation gives parents, whose children are
enrolled in schools determined to be in academic crisis, the option to
select enrollment in another public school. 548 During the 1991 ses-
sion, choice legislation was examined in the House Education Com-
mittee but no action was taken. 49
18. Louisiana
During the 1990 and 1991 legislative sessions, the Louisiana leg-
islature examined a voucher system which would have given parents
subsidies to choose a public, private, or parochial institution, with
funding following the student to the new school. 55 0 No legislation
resulted from this action. 551
541. Id.
542. Id. para. (2).
543. Id. para. (3).
544. Id. para. (15).
545. Id. para. (I I).
546. Id. para. (7).
547. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 104.
548. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.6455(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
549. LEGISLATION REVIEW, supra note 5, at 6 (1992 Update).
550. Union Vows to Fight Plan for Education Payments, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Nov. 27, 1991, at B8.
551. Id.
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19. Maine
In 1991, 1992, and 1993, an education choice bill, "An Act to
Establish a Choice Program," was introduced to the legislature but
later died.552
20. Maryland
During the 1991 legislative session, a pilot voucher program for
low-income students enrolled in the Baltimore City elementary
schools was proposed.553 The bill would have allowed up to 100 such
students to attend any school in the state of Maryland. 554 The bill
received literally no support in the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and was reported out of committee unfavorably.555
Early in 1992, another version of the Baltimore voucher pilot pro-
gram was introduced in the House Ways and Means Committee. 55
This version extended the parameters of the 1991 proposal to Prince
George's County students as well.557 In 1993, Governor William
Donald Schaefer publicly endorsed a bill which would have allowed
200 low-income Baltimore children to attend private schools at the
taxpayers' expense.558 The proposal was defeated in March of 1993
by a narrow margin. 559
21. Massachusetts
An interdistrict choice bill was enacted in Massachusetts during
the 1991 legislative session. 560 The bill included language that made
it obligatory for the state to fund the program;56 1 however, the legis-
lature did not appropriate funds, nor did it include language neces-
sary to implement the bill.5 2 Amendments passed during 1991 gave
the state the right to take money from a city or town's local aid
program to help pay the tuition of a student transferring out of the
552. 20-A MRSA c. 214, § 5301, 116th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Feb. 8, 1993) (failed to pass).
553. Lawrence S. Callahan, For True Choice in Education, Look to the Catholic Schools,
BALT. EVENING SUN, Feb. 14, 1992, at A13.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. John W. Freece, Tuition Vouchers Proclaimed as Way to Force Public School Improve-
ment, BALT. MORNING SUN. Feb. 13, 1992, at C3.
557. Id.
558. John Roll, Senate, House Panels at Odds Over Schaefer Education Proposals State
House Report. BALT. MORNING SUN, March 12, 1993, at B2.
559. Mark Bomster, Non-Catholic Parents Put Faith in Parochial School, BALT. MORNING
SUN. March 28, 1993, at BI.
560. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 12B (West Supp. 1993).
56 1. Id.
562. Id.
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school district in that city or town.563 This particular facet of the
legislation has caused some districts to lose hundreds of thousands
of dollars in local aid to other districts. One low-income city lost
$300,000 in local aid to a more affluent city through the transfer
program. 5 "
The interdistrict open enrollment system, as it stands following
the 1991 amendments, states that any child may transfer from the
school district or residence to a public school in another school dis-
trict as long as the transfer is approved by the receiving district's
school committee. 65 The state pays the school committee a tuition
rate which cannot exceed the average expense per student.566 In ad-
dition, the law includes language prohibiting discriminatory admis-
sion policies based on the race, color, religion, creed, national origin,
sex, age, ancestry, athletic performance, physical handicap, special
need, academic performance, or English proficiency of a child. 5 7
Currently, the issue of transportation expenses is unsettled. 68
22. Michigan
Michigan presently has legislation pending that would create a
-mandatory statewide choice program applicable to all school
districts. 69
23. Minnesota
In 1987, Minnesota passed a comprehensive interdistrict open en-
rollment program whereby students residing in all districts may
transfer across district lines as long as the receiving district has
space available.570 The legislation went into effect in the September
of 1990,571 and it "allows taxpayers to deduct from state taxable
income amounts paid for tuition, textbooks, and transportation of
dependents attending an elementary or secondary school of whatever
563. Teresa M. Hanafin, Joint Panel is Urged to Halt School Choice Law, BOSTON GLOBE.
Nov. 13, 1991, at 30.
564. Id.
565. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 12B (West Supp. 1993).
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Muriel Cohen, Schooling By Selection Choice Plan Raises Confusion Worry Over Fiscal
Fairness, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. II, 1991, at MI.
569. Joan Richardson, Engler Wants Plan to Start in '92, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 6, 1991,
at Al. See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 105.
570. MINN. STAT. § 120.062(1), (2) (1993).
571. Id. § 123.
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type."572 Parents can deduct up to $650 per dependent for grades
kindergarten through six and up to $1,000 per dependent for grades
seven through twelve. 73
State per-pupil funding follows each student to the receiving dis-
trict under the Minnesota legislation. 74 Under the open enrollment
plan, transportation costs are generally borne by the parents, except
for students who are eligible for the school lunch program; 575 the
state reimburses the receiving districts for transportation of these
students. 76 The open enrollment plan does not include provisions to
aid schools which may lose students through the transfer
program.177
In 1991, the Minnesota Legislature expanded the choice program.
Passage of a bill creating charter schools (also referred to as out-
come-based education) permitted the development of up to eight
such schools in the state, with no more than two per district.5  A
local school board and the state board of education must approve
such schools, and the schools can be established only by licensed
teachers practicing outcome-based education. Charters may be
granted to private schools, though not to those affiliated with secta-
rian institutions.5 °
24. Mississippi
The state's governor has "campaigned in favor of school choice
and has created a task force looking at school reform, but no choice
proposals have emerged as yet. In addition, Senator Mike Gunn in-
troduced legislation, S 2590, that would ask the State Board to
study the possibility of offering post-secondary [sic] options to 11 th
and 12th graders. 5 81 The legislature has taken no further action
concerning school choice.582
572. LEGISLATION REVIEW, supra note 5, at 9 (1992 Update).
573. Id.
574. MINN. STAT. § 123 (1993).
575. Id. § 120.062(9).
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. MINN. STAT. § 120.064(3)(b) (1993).
579. Id. subd. (4).
580. Id. subd. (8)(c); see also supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (analyzing the Min-
nesota charter school plan).
581. LEGISLATION REVIEW, supra note 5, at 8.
582. Telephone Interview with Rhonda Kaiser, Attorney, Mississippi Legislative Education
Committee (Sept. 1, 1993).
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25. Missouri
The latest data from the United States Department of Education
concerning school choice in Missouri shows that in 1992, three bills
involving vouchers or tuition tax credits were introduced into the
legislature.583 However, there was no official action on any of the
proposed legislation.58 In 1993, however, the state legislature ap-
proved Senate Bill 380, "The Outstanding Schools Act," to comply
with state standards for equalizing academic standards and meeting
equity funding goals for public education in the state.5 85 There is a
"choice" provision in the bill whereby a student attending those
school districts deemed "unaccredited" by the state board of educa-
tion may enroll in an accredited school in another district. The stu-
dent's resident school district pays the necessary tuition and trans-
portation costs." 586
26. Montana
Currently, Montana is not considering any school choice
legislation.587
27. Nebraska
Nebraska's open enrollment law 588 is modeled after the Minne-
sota open enrollment program. 589 The state began phasing in the
program during the 1990-91 school year, and it was fully imple-
mented by the start of the 1993-94 school year. 9 One of the main
goals of the legislation is to induce competitiveness between school
districts as a means to promote improved instruction, although no
specific language promoting improvements for all schools was at-
tached to the open enrollment plan. 591 Transporting students to the
new school district is the parents' responsibility, although receiving
districts have the option to provide transportation.592 Students re-
583. LEGISLATION REVIEW. supra note 5, at 9.
584. Id.
585. 1993 Mo. S.B. 380, 87th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Feb. 23, 1993); MISSOURI DEPT.
OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, SENATE BILL 380 INFORMATION: SUMMARY OF
MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE OUTSTANDING SCHOOLS ACT (June 17, 1993).
586. 1993 Mo. S.B. 380, § 167.131(1), 87th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Feb. 23, 1993).
587. CARNEGIE REPORT. supra note 42, at 106.
588. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-3401 to -3418 (Supp. 1992).
589. See supra notes 570-80 and accompanying text (examining the Minnesota choice
legislation).
590. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-3405(l), (4) (Supp. 1992).
591. Id.
592. Id. § 79-3410.
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questing transfers in the state may do so only once unless their fam-
ily relocates, and the student must remain in the new school district
for at least one year. 593 The legislation requires parents to describe a
"substantial educational opportunity available" in the receiving dis-
trict that is not available in the student's district of residence.594
Until the 1993-94 school year, participation in the open enroll-
ment program was voluntary.5 95 During the 1991-92 and 1992-93
school years, transfers were limited to five and ten percent, respec-
tively, of the districts' total enrollment.5 91 Such restrictions on trans-
fers no longer apply after the 1993-94 school year.
28. Nevada
The legislature may consider choice legislation during the 1993
session, and "[s]tate education officials predict 'a hard-fought bat-
tle,' particularly if the plan includes private schools. 597
29. New Hampshire
In 1992, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided two cases
that threatened the school choice programs in the state. The first
concerned Epsom, New Hamphsire, a small town without a public
high school.598 In 1990, Epsom selectmen passed a tax abatement
program whereby residents would receive up to $1,000 in tuition re-
imbursement for sending their children to high schools in other pub-
lic school districts.599 Thirty-five local residents sued, arguing that
such local legislative action was in violation of the state constitu-
tion.600 The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that the local
government was "less than boundless"' 1 in its authority to interpret
the state constitution regarding tax abatements and that the Epsom
selectmen had failed to meet the "good cause" requirement to qual-
ify under the state statute; hence, the tax abatement plan was over-
turned. 02 The court did not address the issue of students attending
private or sectarian schools or the effect of state action on tax
593. Id. § 79-3403, -3406.
594. Id. § 79-3406.
595. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-3405(1), (4) (Supp. 1992).
596. Id. § 79-3405(3).
597. CARNEGIE REPORT. supra note 42, at 107.
598. Barksdale v. Town of Epsom, 618 A.2d 814, 815 (N.H. 1992).
599. Id. at 815.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 817.
602. Id. at 816.
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abatements.
In the second action, the state supreme court was asked by the
legislature to render an advisory opinion on whether a proposed
state voucher program that allowed parents to send their children to
any approved school - public, private, or sectarian - and which
required the sending district to pay up to 75 percent of the tuition of
the new school would pass state constitutional muster.o3 The court
ruled that the voucher legislation would violate the state's constitu-
tional prohibition against compelling any person "to pay towards the
support of the schools of any sect or denomination. "60 4 The court
also noted that sectarian schools "predominate among the non-pub-
lic schools." 60 5
30. New Jersey
The Governor and two legislators proposed an amendment to the
state's Quality Education Act in 1992. °6 The bill authorizes the
creation of two charter schools in each county of the state.60 7 The
schools would be created and run by teachers and parents and could
be limited by age group, grade level, teaching method, or subject
matter.60 8 Limits on achievement, aptitude, or intellectual or ath-
letic prowess are prohibited, but there is nothing in the language of
the bill prohibiting discrimination based on race, gender, or disabil-
ity."0 9 The bill has not yet received a recommendation from the leg-
islature's education committee. 610
In 1993, two legislators introduced a public schooi choice pro-
gram."' f This program would allow pupils in certain public school
special needs districts to attend a school in another public school
district starting in the 1994-95 school year. 612 The board of educa-
tion in each district that decides to participate in the program would
determine the number of nonresident pupils which could attend its
schools.6 13 Any pupil suffering from a severe disability would not be
603. Opinion of the Justices (Choice in Education), 616 A.2d 478, 479 (N.H. 1992).
604. Id. at 480.
605. Id.
606. 1992 N.J. A.B. 1862, 205th N.J. Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Sept. 21, 1992).
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 2.
610. Telephone Interview with Lisha Woods, Staff, New Jersey General Assembly (Sept. 3,
1993).
611, 1993 N.J. A.B. 2355, 205th N.J. Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (March 1, 1993).
612. Id.
613. Id.
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allowed to participate in this program,6 14 and transportation costs
would be provided by the school district of residence.61 5 If the school
district of residence fails to provide transportation, the school dis-
trict of attendance would receive aid and provide transportation.1 '
If neither district provides transportation, the parents of the pupil
would receive $675 or the per-pupil amount determined for non-
public school transportation to assist with transportation costs.617
31. New Mexico
Based on New Mexico's open enrollment program, students may
attend any public school in the state if space is available. 8 State
per-pupil funding follows the student to any school, but districts are
only responsible for providing transportation for students attending
a school in their district of residence.61 9 No new choice legislation
had been introduced as of the end of the 1992 session. A voucher
plan was listed as a bill in 1991, but was not carried over into the
1992 legislative session.62 °
32. New York
Two choice proposals were introduced in the New York Assembly
during the 1993 session. The first proposed the creation of a demon-
stration voucher program to enable four school districts around the
state to establish demonstration voucher programs.62' The program
was designed to allow students to attend public or private schools,
and Was aimed primarily at districts with high concentrations of
poor students.6 22 The second proposal suggested an amendment to
the tax law that would allow taxpayers with a net taxable income of
$30,000 or below to deduct tuition, textbooks, and transportation
expenses for dependents from their federal adjusted gross income. 2 3
The proposal included a $650 credit for students in grades one
through eight, and a $1,000 credit for students in grades nine
through twelve.624 No tax credit was included for instructional
614. Id. at 3.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 3-4.
617. Id.
618. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-5 (Michie 1992).
619. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 107.
620. LEGISLATION REVIEW, supra note 5, at 10.
621. 1993 N.Y. S.B. 1459, 215th N.Y. Gen. Assembly, Ist Reg. Sess. (Feb. 2, 1993).
622. Id.
623. 1993 N.Y. A.B. 2690, 215th N.Y. Gen. Assembly, Ist Reg. Sess. (Feb. 3, 1993).
624. Id.
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books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doc-
trines, or worship.625 Further, the credit would not be available to
offset expenses incurred at a for-profit school.6 26
The East Harlem School District, which established one of the
first school choice programs in the country, is an anomaly in New
York. 27 The demographic student make-up in the East Harlem
schools is 60 percent Hispanic, 35 percent African-American, four
percent white, and one percent Asian.6 28 The program is celebrated
by its, supporters as being one of the most successful examples of
choice, having raised the reading scores of its students by over 65
percent compared to other students within the city and state.629 As
of late, however, researchers have criticized that achievement as be-
ing the result of a variety of factors, only one of which may be
choice. 30
33. North Carolina
North Carolina recently considered two bills dealing with school
choice. One would have authorized a program of choice in counties
with a population exceeding 300,000 that have more than one local
school administrative unit,631 but the bill was withdrawn from fur-
ther consideration in 1992.632 Another, called "Project Genesis,"
promotes the restructuring of the public schools in four school dis-
tricts in the state. 33
Project Genesis was enacted in the summer of 1992.634 The legis-
lation calls for the state board of education to create a four-year
pilot program in up to two schools in each of four school districts.635
Restructuring under the plan includes flexibility and accountability,
competitive bidding on the management of schools, and magnet
schools.636
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 44.
628. Wriston, supra note 213, at 83.
629. JEANNE ALLEN & ANGELA HULSEY, SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS: WHAT'S HAPPENING IN
THE STATES 19 (1992).
630. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 43-46; PENNSYLVANIA REPORT. supra note 171,
at 9-10; Kirp, supra note 55, at 27.
631. 1991 N.C. H.B. 937, 139th N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1991 Reg. Sess (April 19, 1991).
632. Id. The bill was withdrawn on July 25, 1992. Id.
633. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.22 to -.25 (Supp. 1992).
634. Id.
635. Id. § 115C-238.22.
636. .1d.
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Project Genesis also calls on local school boards to implement a
program allowing teams of educators to open schools, and mandates
private funding before a school is eligible to receive additional state
or local funds. 37 The proposal also demands that local school
boards develop a process to maintain a racially balanced student
population. 38
34. North Dakota
Discussions are under way for implementing a plan similar to
Minnesota's, but no choice legislation is currently pending.6"9
35. Ohio
Ohio's intradistrict choice plan, to which all of the state's public
schools districts must adhere, took effect in the Fall of 1993.640 Ad-
ditionally, legislation requires all local school boards to either accept
or reject participation in an interdistrict transfer plan with adjoining
districts. 4' Within this program, limitations are placed on transfers
that would negatively affect racial guidelines in each district. 42
In addition, three new voucher-oriented bills were introduced in
the state legislature during the 1992 legislative session that have not
been called to a vote. 43 House Bill 635 would create a five-year
pilot program permitting "at-risk" students to attend private and
sectarian schools." 4 House Bill 825 is similar, except it requires par-
ticipating sectarian schools to issue a statement that students are
not compelled to adhere to any specific religion. 45 Finally, House
Bill 851 would submit the question of overall private/sectarian
school participation in a voucher program to the electorate for an
upcoming referendum. 6"
36. Oklahoma
Oklahoma introduced its interdistrict transfer program in 1991.647
637. Id. § 115-238.23(b), (d).
638. Id. § 115c-238.23(c)(4).
639. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 108; LEGISLATION REVIEW, supra note 5, at 10.
640. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.97(B) (Anderson Supp. 1992).
641. Id. § 3313.98(B).
642. Id. para. (2)(c).
643. See 1992 Ohio H.B. 635, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1992); 1992
Ohio H.B. 825, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (July 15, 1992); 1992 Ohio H.B. 851,
119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Aug. 28, 1992).
644. 1992 H.B. 635 at 1.
645. 1992 H.B. 825 at 6.
646. 1992 H.B. 851 at 1.
647. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 8-101 to 8-103 (West Supp. 1993).
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The enacted legislation formalized the process and required only the
agreement of superintendents from both the sending and receiving
districts.648
37. Oregon
The Oregon legislature is currently considering a proposed statute
that would institute both intradistrict and interdistrict choice in
public schools.649 The proposed law would require the State Board
of Education to set guidelines and develop models for districts wish-
ing to participate in choice programs.6 50
38. Pennsylvania
A 1991 voucher proposal, which would have amended the state
Public School Code of 1949 and permitted the awarding of vouchers
of up to $900 for students to attend any public, private, or parochial
school in the state, was defeated. 51 In deciding that tuition vouchers
were unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania House relied on several sec-
tions of the Pennsylvania Constitution which prohibit the disburse-
ment of state funds to sectarian institutions. 652 The legislative delib-
erations over the bill resulted in heated battles between lawmakers,
and at one point a racial argument ensued.653 In the Senate, one
side had stipulated that minority students could only move to pri-
vate/sectarian schools if "[those schools] have room for them. 654 In
the hearings surrounding the proposed legislation, one parochial rep-
resentative stated that the parish residents had priority for slots in
the schools. The representative testified that there was a six- or
seven-year waiting list for one school he had recently visited.655
648. Id. § 8-102(A).
649. David Ammons, Education Legislation Falls Short of Gardner's Goals, OREGONIAN, Apr.
9, 1990, at D2. Oregon has enacted a "Learning By Choice" program. The legislation also in-
cludes a "Running Start" program which allows seventh and eighth grade students to enroll in
high school courses early, and allows juniors and seniors to attend colleges under a postsecondary
option. Id.
650. Id.
651. PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, supra note 333, at 1918-29; Wendy Greenberg,
School Choice Issue Not Gone, Educators Predict, PHIL. INQUIRER, Dec. 26, 1991, at H18.
652. PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, supra note 333, at 1920. The applicable sections
relied on by the Pennsylvania House included Article I, section 3 and Article 1II, sections 29-30 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, and Article I of the United States Constitution. Id.
653. Id.
654. Hearings of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, House Bill 953, line 3141 (Dec.
ll, 1991).
655. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT. supra note 171, at 16.
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39. Rhode Island
Rhode Island has no choice legislation and is not considering any
at the present time. 56
40. South Carolina
Two bills were introduced into the legislature in 1991 and were
carried over into the 1992 session. The bills dealt, respectively, with
open enrollment and with a voucher system involving both public
and private schools.657 At the time of this writing, no official action
had been taken on either bill.658
41. South Dakota
Due to the rural nature of the state, school choice is not an issue
in South Dakota.659
42. Tennessee
House Bill 2662, a choice-related proposal, was presented to the
Tennessee House Education Committee in March of 1992.660 The
bill included provisions for intradistrict and interdistrict open enroll-
ment programs, for scholarships which could be used for attending
private schools, and for postsecondary enrollment options for high
school students.661
43. Texas
Two voucher bills have been introduced in the Texas Legislature,
one of which specifically targets educationally-disadvantaged stu-
dents.6 2 Several of the school districts in some of the state's larger
cities have operated magnet schools for years.68 3
44. Utah
Utah first passed open enrollment legislation in 1990. The Utah
"Student Enrollment Options Bill," amended in 1991, is designed so
that local school boards may participate in an open enrollment pro-
656. See LEGISLATION REVIEW, supra note 5, at 11 (stating that a proposal for vouchers was
introduced but did not make it out of the committee).
657. Id.
658. Id.
659. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 110.
660. LEGISLATION REVIEW, supra note 5, at 12.
661. Id.
662. See Adam Urbanski, Is Letting Parents Choose Public School the Answer?, HOUSTON
POST. Aug. 30, 1991, at A25; Felton West, Plan Would Promote Separate, Unequal Education,
HOUSTON POST, June 11, 1992, at A41.
663. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 110.
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gram."6 4 The program promotes both intradistrict and interdistrict
transfers.665 Under the 1991 amendment, the resident district pays
one-half of the resident district's per-student expenditure above the
value of the state contribution to the nonresident district for each
resident student properly registered in the nonresident district.666
The law also provides that the State Board of Education shall estab-
lish policies regarding nonresident student participation in interscho-
lastic competition. 6 7
45. Vermont
Vermont has one of the oldest systems of limited choice in the
United States. If a community is too small to support a public
school beyond the elementary grades, the town will send a child to
the school of his/her choice and fund the tuition in a public or non-
sectarian private school.66 8 Since many smaller communities offer
public school only through the elementary grades, this provision en-
sures access to education through high school. 6 9
46. Virginia
Two school choice measures were introduced during the 1993 leg-
islative session in Virginia. The first, which became law, allows par-
ents to choose a school within the resident school district or in an-
other district participating in the alternative attendance program. 611
The second choice measure, which failed to pass out of the legisla-
ture, would have given students residing in economically-deficient
areas a certificate for educational services at a participating school
selected by the child's parent or guardian.67' Any public or private,
nonsectarian school could be selected under the proposed plan.672
47. Washington
During the 1990 session of the Washington Legislature, two ver-
siofis of school choice legislation were enacted. One proposes the
funding of pilot projects followed by a study to determine if the pro-
664. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-2-207(I) (Supp. 1993).
665. Id.
666. Id. § 53A-2-210(2).
667. Id. § 53A-2-208(4).
668. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 822, 827 (1989).
669. Id.
670. 1993 Va. H.B. 1993, 1992-93 Reg. Sess. (April 7, 1993).
671. 1993 Va. H.B. 2266, 1992-93 Reg. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1993).
672. Id.
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gram positively affects student achievement.673 The second man-
dates a statewide interdistrict school choice system.6 74 This legisla-
tion strongly encourages interdistrict transfers for those students
whose financial, educational, safety, or health situations would rea-
sonably be improved or in situations where the student's school
would be more accessible to parental worksites or a childcare facil-
ity.17 Transfers are considered illegitimate if they negatively affect
existing desegregation plans. 6 Districts may establish fees for non-
resident transfer students. 7
The bill also created the "Running Start Program," which allows
high school juniors and seniors to attend vocational technical insti-
tutes or community colleges on a full- or part-time basis while con-
currently enrolled in high school6 78 The school district is required to
transmit funds for the higher education classes on a proportional
basis.67 9 No money is provided for transportation.68 °
48. West Virginia
During 1992, proposals were made for a $500 tax credit for pri-
vate education and a voucher program of up to $2,500 per student
for low-income children.8 81 Later, a second tax credit bill was intro-
duced.6 82 However, the legislature failed to take action on any of
these initiatives. 683
49. Wisconsin
Choice in Wisconsin is limited to a pilot voucher program in Mil-
waukee. 84 Based on legislation passed in 1990, up to 1,000 low-
income children may attend private, nonsectarian schools.6 85 In the
second year of the program, approximately 600 students transferred
out of the public schools. 686 In the program's first year, a number of
the students had to transfer back into public schools mid-year when
673. WASH. REV. CODE ANN, § 28A.225.320 (West Supp. 1993).
674. Id. § 28A.225.220.
675. Id. paras. (3)(a), (b).
676. Id. para. (4).
677. Id. para. (6).
678. Id. § 28A.600.310.
679. Id. para. (2).
680. Id. § 28A.600.380.
681. LEGISLATION REVIEW. supra note 5, at 13.
682. Id.
683. Id.
684. WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1990).
685. Id.
686. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 18.
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one of the schools participating in the program was forced to shut
down. 87
In March of 1992, the Wisconsin State Supreme Court upheld
passage of the program as constitutional."' The process through
which the program had been passed by the legislature had been
challenged by the state superintendent of public instruction as well
as by numerous amici, including the Wisconsin Education Associate
Council.68 9 The state supreme court reversed the lower court and
held that the legislation creating the voucher program did not vio-
late the doctrine of spending state money for the public good. 690 The
Court noted that sufficient safeguards were included in the program
to make sure that participating private schools were adequately su-
pervised by the government, thus ensuring that they would accom-
plish the public purpose of improving educational quality.691 The
court also ruled that the program met the state's uniformity require-
ment because it did not deprive students of the opportunity to attend
a public school with a uniform character of education. 692
50. Wyoming
This state has initiated no choice legislation due to its rural na-
ture and its sparse population. 93
687. Id.
688. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992).
689. Id. at 462, 465.
690. Id. at 477.
691. Id.
692. Id. at 474.
693. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 42, at 112.
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